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Kurzfassung
Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit und Skalierbarkeit sind die beiden maßgeblichen Faktoren,
die die Verbreitung von Clouds behindern. Die Mo¨glichkeit privilegierter Zugriffe auf
Kundendaten durch einen Cloudanbieter schra¨nkt die Nutzung von Clouds bei der
Verarbeitung von sicherheitskritischen und vertraulichen Informationen ein. Clouddienste
mit niedriger Latenz erfordern die Durchfu¨hrungen von Berechnungen im Hauptspeicher
und sind daher an Charakteristika von Dynamic RAM (DRAM) wie Kapazita¨t, Dichte,
Energieverbrauch und andere Aspekte gebunden.
Zwei technologische Bereiche befassen sich mit diesen Faktoren: Etablierte Server
Plattformen wie Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) und AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualisation (SEV) stellen Erweiterungen fu¨r vertrauenswu¨rdige Ausfu¨hrung in nicht
vertrauenswu¨rdigen Umgebungen bereit. Verschiedene Technologien von nicht flu¨chtigem
Speicher bieten bessere Kapazita¨t und Speicherdichte verglichen mit DRAM, und ko¨nnen
daher in Zukunft als Alternative zu DRAM herangezogen werden. Jedoch beno¨tigen
diese Technologien und Erweiterungen neuartige Ansa¨tze und Systemunterstu¨tzung bei
der Programmierung, da diese der Systemarchitektur neue Funktionalita¨t hinzufu¨gen:
Systemkomponenten (Intel SGX) und Persistenz (nicht-flu¨chtiger Speicher).
Diese Dissertation widmet sich der Programmierung und den Architekturaspekten
von persistenten und vertrauenswu¨rdigen Systemen. Fu¨r vertrauenswu¨rdige Systeme
wurde eine detaillierte Analyse der neuen Architekturerweiterungen durchgefu¨hrt.
Außerdem wurden das neuartige “EActors” Framework und die “STANlite” Datenbank
entwickelt, um die neuen Mo¨glichkeiten von vertrauenswu¨rdiger Ausfu¨hrung effektiv
zu nutzen. Daru¨ber hinaus wurde fu¨r persistente Systeme eine detaillierte Analyse
zuku¨nftiger Speichertechnologien, deren Merkmale und mo¨gliche Auswirkungen auf die
Systemarchitektur durchgefu¨hrt. Ferner wurde das neue Hypervisor-basierte Persistenzmodell
entwickelt und mittels NV-Hypervisor ausgewertet, welches transparente Persistenz fu¨r alte
und proprieta¨re Software, sowie Virtualisierung von persistentem Speicher ermo¨glicht.
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Abstract
Trust and scalability are the two significant factors which impede the dissemination
of clouds. The possibility of privileged access to customer data by a cloud provider
limits the usage of clouds for processing security-sensitive data. Low latency cloud
services rely on in-memory computations, and thus, are limited by several characteristics
of DRAM such as capacity, density, energy consumption, for example.
Two technological areas address these factors. Mainstream server platforms, such
as Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation
(SEV) offer extensions for trusted execution in untrusted environments. Various
technologies of Non-Volatile RAM (NV-RAM) have better capacity and density
compared to DRAM and thus can be considered as DRAM alternatives in the future.
However, these technologies and extensions require new programming approaches
and system support since they add features to the system architecture: new system
components (Intel SGX) and data persistence (NV-RAM).
This thesis is devoted to the programming and architectural aspects of persistent
and trusted systems. For trusted systems, an in-depth analysis of new architectural
extensions was performed. A novel framework named EActors and a database engine
named STANlite were developed to effectively use the capabilities of trusted execution.
For persistent systems, an in-depth analysis of prospective memory technologies,
their features and the possible impact on system architecture was performed. A new
persistence model, called the hypervisor-based model of persistence, was developed and
evaluated by the NV-Hypervisor. This offers transparent persistence for legacy and
proprietary software, and supports virtualisation of persistent memory.
v
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1. Introduction
Outsourcing of data processing applications to cloud infrastructures has become
best practice. Clouds offer lower costs and robust scalability of services, which are
essential for both end users and enterprises. The growing market of public cloud
services supports this statement: the market has grown approximately 18% each year
since 2009 and reached $153B in 2017 [3]. According to Gartner, this trend will continue:
by the year 2021, the market will double [4]. While analysts forecast further growth,
they also pay attention to market challenges such as trust [5] and scalability [6].
Trust is the fundamental factor of cloud computing. A cloud user expects that
their data is protected, and neither other users nor the staff of a cloud provider
can access it. Unauthorised access to private data1, data breaches2, long-lived
critical software vulnerabilities3, and, finally, hardware vulnerabilities such as
Spectre [9] and Meltdown [10] – these and many other incidents demonstrate that
expectations are not met.
Scalability is another important factor of cloud computing. Growing demands in
cloud services are satisfied by the growing performance of CPUs, network bandwidth,
storage sizes, and main memory capacity. The latter plays a crucial role because main
memory has become a driver in the growth of cloud computing. Low-latency cloud
services rely on in-memory data processing, i.e. a form of data processing which
eliminates slow I/O of secondary storage by the storing and processing data inside
main memory only [11]. Growing loads of cloud applications and scalability demands
require providers to use more and more main memory for data processing. However,
several factors impede the satisfaction of this need:
1In 2014 Facebook was suspected of using private data for commercial purposes [7]
2In 2014, attackers entered into a corporate network of eBay using credentials of ex-employees. As a
result, information about 145 millions of eBay users was leaked [8]
3CVE-2018-8781 – eight-year-old critical vulnerability
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• Technological limitations: Large volumes of main memory are unavailable due
to the physical sizes of modules. In contrast to NAND memory technologies,
which are used in Solid-State Drives (SSDs), Dynamic RAM (DRAM) cells require
several times more space [12]
• Growing energy consumption: DRAM modules are built in the form of arrays of
capacitors. These capacitors require constant powering to hold charges, whose
need for electric current grows with the decreasing of cell sizes [13] and increasing
number of modules.
• Data loss risks: Cloud infrastructure loses volatile data in the case of a power
failure. Increasing in-memory data volumes results in an increase of recovery time
and costs of power outages, the value of which constantly grows [14].
Two memory-related research areas address these challenges. The first one,
devoted to memory encryption and trusted execution, is considered in the next section.
The second one, dealing with non-volatile memory technologies and persistent systems, is
considered below.
Memory encryption and trusted execution
Technologies of main memory encryption play a central role in trusted execution.
Originally, they were used to prevent attacks on memory content. In-memory data
can be retrieved directly by a cold-boot attack [15], or remotely by a Direct Memory
Access (DMA) attack [16]. In both these cases, an attacker obtains a memory image,
and encrypting of the memory prevents data leakage [17]. Nowadays, modern
mainstream server platforms include extensions for trusted execution with memory
encryption in their bases.
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation (SEV) [18] enables trusted execution in the
form of encrypted Virtual Machines (VMs), isolated from all privileged software and
peripheral devices. Physical memory pages of these VMs are encrypted, and processes
of encryption/decryption take place inside a memory controller without exposing
cryptographic keys. Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) [19] also uses memory
encryption to enable trusted execution, but provides this in the form of new system
components called enclaves.
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Enclaves are isolated regions of code and data inside user-space programs. Only
code located inside an enclave can access data of the same enclave [19]. As a
consequence, in contrast to other system components, some restrictions apply to
enclaves. Firstly, enclaved programs, i.e. programs executing inside enclaves, are
self-contained and can not have any dependencies beyond the borders of their own
enclave [20]. Secondly, the programs cannot issue system calls. Communication with
the kernel can be performed via costly transition calls, named ECALLs and OCALLs,
based on the SGX-specific instructions EENTER and EEXIT, respectively. Transitions cost
at least 8000 CPU cycles, which is approximately 50 times slower than that of ordinary
system calls [21]. Therefore, all kinds of operations which require the involvement
of the kernel, in particular synchronisation mechanisms, become very costly. Thirdly,
the use of enclaves causes heavyweight paging if the total size of memory used by all
enclaves reaches the border in approximately 92 MiB [22].
Subject to these limitations, several programming approaches and frameworks
for SGX-based trusted execution were proposed. Firstly, Intel provides SGX Software
Development Kit (SDK), which enables integration of enclaves and programs in a
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) manner [23]. A developer can implement functions which
need to be executed inside enclaves, and an RPC interface for interaction of untrusted
software with the enclaved functions. This approach is suitable for development of
applications where enclaved software augments the untrusted part. SecureKeeper [24]
is an example of a system which successfully applies this approach to secure data
processing in untrusted cloud setting. While SGX SDK provides necessary primitives to
program enclaves, it does not mitigate the mentioned restrictions of enclaves.
Secondly, enclaves can be considered as a secure environment for execution of
legacy programs. For example, a database can provide confidential computations
while being executed inside an enclave. In this scheme, untrusted software provides
mechanisms for interaction with hardware, while the enclaved software performs
the whole computations and data processing. To port existing services into this
restricted environment, several frameworks, such as SCONE [25], Haven [26], and
Graphene-SGX [27], were proposed. Some of them, like SCONE, provide an
asynchronous call interface, which eliminates the transition costs of ECALLs.
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While these frameworks mitigate some restrictions of enclave programming, they
have a disadvantage. They offer single-enclave monolithic solutions in which all
components of enclaved software share the same enclave. This approach increases
the size of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which in turn increases the attack surface.
Meanwhile, a single process can host multiple enclaves, and thus, an application can
have a partitioned, low-TCB, multi-enclave design. The frameworks do not consider
such programming models nor provide the corresponding system support, such as
mechanisms for enclave-to-enclave communication.
Based on this, one can ask the research question: What is a better programming
model and system support for SGX enclaves?
Non-volatile memory and persistent systems
Technological limitations, growing energy consumption and data loss risks can be
mitigated by emerging memory technologies such as Phase-Change RAM (PC-RAM),
Magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) and others. Compared to DRAM, these technologies
have two significant advantages: better capacity and density, and persistence. The first
advantage can significantly increase the volume of available main memory and make
them comparable in size with SSD [28, 29]. The second advantage resolves an issue
of growing energy consumption and data loss risks since persistent memory does not
require the use of an external source of power to store data [30].
Technologies of persistent memory cannot replace DRAM ”as is” because of several
reasons. Firstly, persistence of the main memory requires revising the whole software
stack. For instance, a program life-cycle, which includes steps of creation of an execution
context in main memory, data copying from secondary storage to primary, the execution
itself and memory deallocation after termination, is based on the assumption that
main memory is volatile. However, if the main memory becomes persistent, the need
for the secondary storage disappears, and persistent in-memory programs require
a new life-cycle [31]. Secondly, technologies of persistent memory require special
system support since they have their own features and characteristics, like asymmetry
in read/write latencies, low durability and more [32, 12, 33, 34]. Fault models of
Non-Volatile RAM (NV-RAM) technologies differ [35] from the fault models of DRAM
and SSD and thus, system support requires developments of new approaches.
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Various research works considered models of persistence, i.e. generalised
architectures and programming models of persistent systems. Before developments
of non-volatile memory technologies, projects like KeyKOS [36], EROS [37], and
Coyotos [38] implemented checkpoints-based persistence. In this approach, an
operating system duplicates memory pages of a target object on the secondary
storage, and transparently recovers them from the storage after a power failure.
Newton OS, which was used in the first PDAs of Apple, applied a different model of
persistence. The Newton platform used battery-backed main memory which made all
data stored inside it persistent. Newton OS used this persistent storage as object
storage, and provided a unified access layer to distribute over the main memory
and optional flash device objects [39]. Later, three additional persistence models
were introduced for NV-RAM-based platforms.
The first one, the library and language-based model [40, 41], provides persistence
of user-space objects. These objects can be created and used inside persistent memory
using a special memory allocator, integrated into the programming environment. The
second one, the process-based model [42], provides more coarse-grained persistence
by allocating processes inside persistent memory. All objects produced by this kind of
process are persistent. Finally, the system-wide model [43] generalises ideas of persistent
processes to a whole system. In this design, all components of a system are located
inside persistent memory and become persistent per se.
The significant disadvantage of these models, which limits their application
for cloud computing, is a need for modifications of existing systems to utilise the
support of NV-RAM. While it can be performed for Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds, where a service provider controls most components
of a software stack, it is unlikely to be performed for Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) clouds, where a service provider manages only fundamental resources such
as CPU cores, memory volumes and storage capacity [44]. In other words, in IaaS
clouds, persistent memory support should be integrated into the guest software,
which may be impossible since such clouds are often used for virtualisation of
proprietary and legacy software.
It is with this in mind that one can ask the research question: What is a better
model of persistence and system support for persistent memory?
5
1.1 Main Contributions
The thesis presents three main contributions: two related to programming models
(C1) and system support of SGX-based trusted execution (C2), and one related to
programming models and system support of persistent systems (C3):
C1: EActors: actor-based framework for trusted execution
EActors is a programming framework tailored for SGX. It features lightweight
fine-grained parallelism based on the concept of actors. This approach avoids the use of
costly synchronisation primitives, while lightweight nature of the actors significantly
decreases the TCB size. Flexible and seamless design enables reconfiguration of services
in accordance with security and performance demands. Multiple use cases were
considered during evaluation, including schemes with multiple interacting enclaves.
C2: STANlite: a database engine for secure data processing at rack scale level
STANlite is an in-memory database engine for SGX-enabled secure data processing.
It addresses challenges of enclave’s paging and effective interaction of enclaved software
with devices. The engine features small TCB and performs memory virtualisation
without involvement of hardware-based paging. It demonstrated up to 2.44×
performance increase compared to a vanilla SGX-based baseline.
C3: Hypervisor-based persistence and NV-Hypervisor
The conception of hypervisor-based persistence was introduced and evaluated
by NV-Hypervisor. NV-Hypervisor provides transparent persistence for legacy and
proprietary applications executed inside VMs. The hypervisor supports virtualisation
of persistent memory and was evaluated on top of battery-backed NV-RAM. The
evaluation demonstrated the significant decrease of a performance recovery time for a
persistent database and low overhead impact of the virtual memory engine.
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• Vasily A. Sartakov, Stefan Brenner, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Sara Bouchenak, Gae¨l
Thomas and Ru¨diger Kapitza: EActors: Fast and flexible trusted computing using
SGX, Proceedings of the 19th International Middleware Conference. ACM, 2018
• Vasily A. Sartakov, Nico Weichbrodt, Sebastian Krieter, Thomas Leich and Ru¨diger
Kapitza: STANlite - a database engine for secure data processing at rack-scale
level, in IEEE International Conference on Cloud Engineering (IC2E), Orlando,
Florida, U.S.A., 2018
• Vasily A. Sartakov, Arthur Martens and Ru¨diger Kapitza: Temporality a
NVRAM-based virtualization platform, in 34th IEEE Symposium on Reliable
Distributed Systems (SRDS ’15), Montreal, Canada, 2015
• Vasily A. Sartakov and Ru¨diger Kapitza: NV-Hypervisor: Hypervisor-based
Persistence for Virtual Machines, in Workshop on Dependability of Clouds, Data
Centers and Virtual Machine Technology (DCDV 2014), Atlanta, 2014
1.3 Organisation
The thesis has two main parts. The first part (chapter 2) of the thesis is devoted to
main memory encryption and trusted execution. Section 2.2 presents an actor-based
framework and programming model for Intel SGX. Section 2.3 introduces an enclaved
database with virtual memory support. The second part (chapter 3) is devoted to
non-volatile memory technologies and persistent systems. Section 3.2 of this chapter
presents a conception of hypervisor-based persistence and NV-Hypervisor. Chapter 4
concludes the thesis.
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2. Memory encryption and trusted
execution
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation
(SEV) are new extensions of commodity server platforms which provide primitives for
trusted execution in clouds. Both of these extensions offer system components which are
inaccessible by privileged software and protected from attacks based on physical access.
Physical memory pages of these components are encrypted, and processes of encryption
and decryption are performed inside memory controllers without exposing encryption
keys. As a result, a cloud user can use cloud infrastructures without risks of data breach.
While both platforms have many similarities, like memory encryption and isolation,
they have different architectures. AMD SEV offers trusted computations at the level
of virtual machines: a cloud user controls its own virtual machines, while a cloud
provider controls the hypervisor and fundamental resources. The interaction between
encrypted Virtual Machines (VMs) and the hypervisor is carried out similarly to
ordinary Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) platforms. Programming of these encrypted
VMs is also identical to that of ordinary VMs: a cloud user prepares a VM image and
uploads it into the cloud.
Intel SGX, in turn, introduced a new system component named enclave. SGX
enclaves only execute in the user-space and have unique features which differ the
programming of enclaves from that of all other components of a system. Some of them
are: trusted programs cannot issue system calls, and interaction between trusted and
untrusted programs is performed in an Remote Procedure Call (RPC)-like way. These
features, the programming models and system support of enclaves, are the primary
topics of this chapter.
This chapter begins with the background section, which overviews modern
platforms for cloud computing. In particular, this section compares two main
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platforms for trusted execution (Intel SGX and AMD SEV), describes challenges in
the programming of enclaves, and provides an overview of related works which
addressed these challenges earlier. Section 2.2 is devoted to the EActors framework –
an actor-based programming framework developed for SGX. Section 2.3 introduces
STANlite – a database engine with virtual memory support developed for SGX-enabled
cloud platforms.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Modern platforms for trusted execution in clouds
Roots of trusted execution in clouds lie in areas of cryptography and developments
of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)4. Cryptography in the era of personal
computers has enabled encryption of storing (DM-crypt5, TrueCrypt6), transferring
(SNP [45], SSL [46], TLS [47]) and in-memory (Armored [48], PRIME [49], Copker [50],
Mimosa [51] ) data. The TCG, in turn, standardised the conception of Trusted
Computing and developed the architecture of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)7 –
a tamper resistant security processor.
On top of this basis, Intel and AMD developed their own platforms for trusted
execution in clouds. Both of these platforms use hardware-accelerated encrypted
memory to protect user data, and complex infrastructures which remove software of a
cloud provider from a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). However, despite the similarities,
these platforms have many differences, which are considered in the following section.
2.1.1.1 AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation (SEV) is an extension which has been
introduced as part of the Ryzen series of AMD CPUs [18] which aims to provide
trusted execution in untrusted environments. This extension was released together
with another extension – AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), which enables
encryption of memory at page granularity. Because both of these technologies use
hardware-accelerated memory encryption, it is reasonable to consider them together.
4Consortium developers of computing systems, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org
5http://www.saout.de/misc/dm-crypt
6http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net
7https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/
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Figure 2.1: Access to encrypted and non-encrypted memory pages in AMD SME
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation (SEV) and Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
have different purposes. SME is aimed at prevention of cold-boot attacks, while SEV
is devoted to trusted execution in clouds. SME encrypts selected memory pages, and
this process is controlled by the Operating System (OS) kernel. The kernel can specify
which page needs to be encrypted by the modification of the C bit (number 47) in a
Page Table Entry (PTE) which defines the corresponding mapping of physical and
virtual pages. If the C bit is enabled for a page, then access to this page involves AES
encryption/decryption (Figure 2.1). SME uses a single encryption key for all pages and
Direct Memory Access (DMA) devices can access encrypted pages.
Secure Encrypted Virtualisation (SEV), in turn, disallows the hypervisor to control
memory mappings. Each virtual machine is encrypted by its own encryption key, and
the hypervisor can neither access it nor disable the encryption. Also, in contrast with
SME, peripheral devices cannot access the memory of virtual machines. Interaction
between the hypervisor and a VM is performed via a special type of encrypted memory,
which is accessible by the hypervisor and the VM simultaneously. Migration of
virtual machines is implemented via a built-in ARM-based security coprocessor, which
establishes a connection between hosts and performs secure data migration without the
involvement of the system software.
In sum, both technologies can be used for execution of encrypted VMs in
clouds. However, these technologies have different threat models: SEV removes the
hypervisor from the TCB, while SME relies on the privileged layer since it applies an
encryption policy.
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Figure 2.2: The structure of Processor Reserved Memory
2.1.1.2 Intel Software Guard eXtensions
The central component of the Intel SGX is an enclave. The enclave is an environment
which includes data and code of a program. Creation and execution of enclaves is
supported by new instructions of the Skylake microarchitecture.
All enclaves are located inside a physical memory region called Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM). Neither system software nor peripheral DMA devices can directly
access this memory region. Direct copying of data from memory modules also does not
expose its content since the PRM data is stored in an encrypted form. Only a limited set
of instructions is available for manipulation of the PRM data.
The PRM region hosts two elements. The first one, called Enclave Page Cache
(EPC), consists of an enclave’s management structures and execution entities (Figure 2.2).
The second one, Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), is a structure, each element of which
describes a single page of the EPC. Each element of the EPCM defines a type of the
corresponding page inside the EPC.
There are several types of EPC pages [52]. Firstly, an EPC page can be used to
store an enclave’s metadata. Each enclave is described by a SGX Enclave Control
Structure (SECS), which is stored inside a metadata page with the SECS type. A SECS
page is used by SGX instructions only and cannot be mapped to virtual memory. A
SECS defines a mode of operation (32 or 64 bits), and a set of processor features used by
the corresponding enclave. An enclave can be created by calling the ECREATE instruction,
and destroyed after removal of the corresponding SECS page from the EPC.
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Secondly, a page can be used to store a Thread Control Structure (TCS). TCSs
define the location of a State Storage Area, Thread-local Storage and some additional data.
These structures are used to store contexts of threads executed inside an enclave. If a
thread leaves an enclave, it saves its own context inside these structures and retrieves
the context when it returns. Each executing thread inside an enclave consumes one
TCS and thus, the number of TCS pages defines the number of threads which can be
executed inside an enclave. TCS pages, as well as SECS pages, are inaccessible by
software. However, pages which are used to store a context, like State Save Area (SSA)
pages, are ordinary EPC pages and can be accessed by enclaved software.
The PRM region is limited in size. The maximum size of the PRM provided by
market-available CPUs is 128 MiB. In addition, not all pages of the PRM are available to
use by programs. The actual size of available memory is near 92 MiB [22].
EPC
E
n
c
la
v
e
E
n
c
la
v
e
ELRANGE ELRANGE
X X X XX X
X
X X
U
nt
ru
st
ed
U
nt
ru
st
ed
V
ir
tu
a
l
P
h
y
si
c
a
l
PT Mappings
Figure 2.3: Mapping of EPC pages to Enclave Linear Address Ranges
Each enclave operates in a region of virtual memory named Enclave Linear Address
Range (ELRANGE). Enclaved software can access the whole range of a process’ virtual
memory (except other enclaves), while non-enclaved software can access only virtual
addresses beyond the ELRANGE borders (Figure 2.3). SGX maps pages stored inside
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an EPC into an ELRANGE. If the ELRANGE size is smaller or equal to the EPC size,
then all physical pages are resident inside the EPC. However, the size of all ELRANGEs
of all processes can be greater than the size of the EPC. In this case, the system software
involves a paging mechanism, which extends the limits of the EPC by page swapping.
EPC pages can be swapped out by calling of the EWB instruction and swapped in by
calling of the ELDU/ELDB instructions. Swapped out pages are stored encrypted in
memory outside the EPC.
Initial filling of an enclave by code/data pages is performed in the initialisation
phase, after the creation of the enclave by the ECREATE instruction [53]. The EADD
instruction performs creation of pages inside the enclave and fills them with the data
taken from an untrusted virtual memory address range. For each new page, the system
software invokes the EEXTEND instruction, which updates the enclave’s measurement
used in the software attestation process (described below). These operations can be
performed only while the corresponding SECS is in the uninitialised state. This state
changes to initialised after issuing of the EINIT instruction.
Attestation and data sealing
The Intel SGX architecture provides mechanisms which allow provisioning of
secrets to an enclave. The first one is attestation – a mechanism for creating an
authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform (local
attestation). The architecture also offers an extended version of attestation, called remote
attestation, which provides assertions to third parties located outside the platform. The
second one is sealing – a mechanism for data encryption in a way which ensures that
the data can be decrypted only inside another trusted enclave. This mechanism can be
used to store secrets persistently when a host system is not active, or for the migration
of secrets between different versions of enclaves.
Local attestation and data sealing rely on two measurement registers,
MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER. The first register provides the identity of an enclave.
This identity includes the content of memory pages, order of the pages inside an enclave,
and security properties associated with these pages. Technically, this value is a SHA-256
digest updated after each is added to the enclave page. The second register provides the
sealer’s identity. After the compilation of an enclave, a developer prepares a certificate
(SIGSTRUCT), which includes the measurement of the enclave, a product identifier, and
14
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Figure 2.4: Local attestation of two enclaves
its own public RSA key. Then the developer signs this certificate and uploads it together
with the enclave to the remote server8. During the booting of the enclave, the Intel
SGX architecture verifies this certificate, compares the generated and the certificate’s
measurements, and fills MRSIGNER with a hash value of the public RSA key if the
measurements are equal.
For data sealing, the Intel SGX architecture can base the encryption key on any
of these registers. In the first case, the architecture generates sealed data which can
be decrypted only inside the enclave that sealed it (or any other instance of the same
enclave image). Other enclaves cannot do this since different enclaves have different
MRENCLAVE values. In the second case, the architecture generates sealed data which
can be decrypted only inside enclaves signed by the same RSA key.
Attestation demonstrates that an enclave is properly instantiated on the platform.
In local attestation, this process involves two enclaves located on the same platform.
Local attestation consists of two steps, which are depicted in Figure 2.4. During
the first step, the requester enclave sends its own MRENCLAVE to the responder.
Then, the responder prepares a report, generated by the EREPORT instruction together
with the MRENCLAVE value. The report includes two identities of the enclave
(MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER), metadata of the enclave, user-provided data, and
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. The MAC is produced by a key called
the ”Report key”, which is known only to the target (requester) enclave and to the
EREPORT instruction. Then the responder sends the report to the requester. The requester
retrieves its own ”Report key”, computes the MAC of the report and compares it with
the MAC tag of the report. A match of these MACs confirms that both enclaves are run
inside the same SGX-enabled platform. Then, the requester can compare MRENCLAVE
of the responder enclave (retrieved from the report) with a pre-defined value to ensure
that the responder enclave reflects the expected content.
8The Intel SGX Software Development Kit (SDK) embeds the certificate into the enclave’s image
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Remote attestation involves three parties [54]: a target server which hosts an
enclave, an attestation service provided by Intel and a remote attester which wants to
attest the enclave. Additionally, the target server needs to use two additional enclaves,
provisioning and quoting. The provisioning enclave generates a certificate which proves
that the target server is a proper SGX-enabled platform. This certificate is signed by the
”Provisioning Key” – a unique key fused and only known by Intel. When the attestation
service verifies the certificate, it sends the ”Attestation Key”. This key is used later by
the quoting enclave. The quoting enclave performs local attestation of the target enclave
and prepares a quote – an attestation report signed by the ”Attestation Key” which can
be verified outside the platform.
2.1.2 Challenges of SGX programming
From the software point of view, the use of enclaves is accompanied by several
restrictions which impact the system performance and a programming model of
enclaved programs. Below, these restrictions will be considered independently.
2.1.2.1 Self-contained environment and high transition costs
Both the code and data sections of an enclaved program are isolated from the
untrusted environment. This means that the enclaved software cannot call code
from shared libraries, or execute other programs. The enclaved program should be
self-contained, otherwise it requires the use of heavyweight calls.
Communication between trusted and untrusted software is performed via special
calls: ECALL and OCALL. ECALLs are used to enter into an enclave and can be
called outside the enclave only. OCALLs, in turn, are used to exit an enclave and,
as a consequence, can be called inside the enclave only. Any other mechanisms for
communication, like traps or trampolines, are forbidden and cannot be used inside
enclaves. These ECALLs and OCALLs are heavyweight and require at least 8000 CPU
cycles [22]. Ordinary system calls, in contrast, require about 150 CPU cycles [21].
Thus, additional untrusted software should be involved for communication
between an enclave and other components of a system including the kernel, or for
calling of non-implemented inside enclave functions. For example, to send a message
from an enclave to a pipe, an enclaved thread should firstly issue an OCALL and
then, with the help of an untrusted library, it should perform a write operation on
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Figure 2.5: Synchronisation costs of pthread mutex versus SGX SDK mutex.
the pipe’s descriptor. After that, the thread can return into the enclave, and for that
it issues a heavyweight ECALL. Additionally, if the target component is not a part of
untrusted software and located inside another enclave, the number of issued ECALLs
and OCALLs doubles.
Synchronisation primitives like pthread’s mutexes also cannot be used inside
enclaves. An enclaved thread cannot request the kernel to suspend it inside an enclave.
Instead, the thread has to issue an ECALL, or use spin-lock based synchronisation. In
fact, the synchronisation solution offered by the SGX SDK combines both approaches.
If two enclaved threads try to access shared data concurrently, they both need to:
• perform a spin-lock based attempt to acquire a lock
• leave the enclave if several iterations of accruing were unsuccessful
• lock a pthread mutex (or become suspended and then lock the mutex)
• enter back to modify shared data
• leave the enclave to unlock the mutex
• enter back to continue the own execution
Figure 2.5 shows the difference between two synchronisation mechanisms: an
ordinary pthread mutex, and an SGX mutex – the synchronisation primitive provided
by the Intel SGX SDK. The figure shows the time necessary to dequeue 106 elements by
the different number of concurrent threads. As can be seen, synchronisations are very
costly and up to 200× slower compared to non-enclaved synchronisation primitives.
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Figure 2.6: Performance of in-enclave memset operation
2.1.2.2 EPC paging
Page eviction takes place when the size of memory used by all enclaves exceeds
the EPC size. Within this process, the SGX driver encrypts some pages located inside
the EPC and evicts them into memory located outside of the PRM. The SGX paging
is heavyweight similar to ECALLs, and has a dramatic impact the performance of
enclaved software.
Figure 2.6 shows the impact of paging on the performance of a microbenchmark.
The simple memset9 function is used inside a single enclave with one TCS to fill various
sizes of memory, started from a chunk 1 MiB in size and up to a chunk 256 MiB in size.
The number of bytes cleared per second is used as the performance metric. As can be
seen, after reaching the EPC border (≈92 MiB), the number of bytes filled per second
decreases 6 times approximately.
There are several reasons for this performance degradation. Firstly, eviction of a
page causes flushing of all cached address translations on all logical processors [55].
This also causes Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX) on all threads which share the same
enclave on all CPU cores. Secondly, since eviction of a page is performed to untrusted
memory, the SGX engine encrypts swapped out pages. Finally, to prevent rollback
and replay attacks, the SGX engine saves nonces in Version Arrays – regions of EPC
memory which store versions of evicted pages. On the swap-in operation, the SGX
engine ensures that only the last evicted version of a page can be loaded.
9In accordance with optimisation flags, a compiler uses different implementations of basic functions
like memset or memcpy. The performance of these functions plays an important role in low-level
measurements. In all experiments and evaluations, the -O2 compiler optimisation flag was used.
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Figure 2.7: E(O)CALLs-based invocation of functions
2.1.3 Related works
While Intel SGX is relatively new technology, it was considered in various research
works. Relevant to the research question of this thesis, the works can be divided into
two groups. The first group is devoted to programming approaches of enclaves. The
second covers system support of enclaves, i.e. aspects of security and performance.
Below, these works will be considered independently.
2.1.3.1 Programming approaches
The spectrum of the enclave’s programming approaches is located between two
extreme cases. The first one is represented by the Intel SGX SDK [56], which enables
programming of enclaves in an RPC-like manner. In this approach, an enclave works
as a TPM. However, in contrast with a hardware TPM, this ”software TPM” can be
uploaded, and a single hardware platform can run multiple ”TPMs”. From the software
point of view, programming approaches of enclaves and TPMs are quite similar: an
enclave includes several trusted functions and these can be called by untrusted software
(Figure 2.7). Transitions between trusted and untrusted software are performed via
heavyweight ECALLs and the SDK provides an Enclave Description Language (EDL),
which helps a developer to design and implement an RPC-like interface. In this
approach, enclaved software is characterised by an extremely small TCB and provides
primitive functions developed especially for enclaves.
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The second case is represented by various projects based on the idea that enclaves
are environments for the trusted execution of complex services. These services should
not be developed from scratch for enclaves but rather be ported to enclaves. However,
since the execution of programs inside enclaves differs from the execution of ordinary
processes, the enclaved software requires additional support provided by frameworks.
A framework should implement missing mechanisms, such as the interaction of
enclaved software with devices or system components. Frameworks and projects like
Haven [26], SCONE [25], Graphene-SGX [27] and Panoply [57] follow this programming
approach, but have different designs and implementations.
As mentioned previously, an enclaved program cannot use system calls but can
use heavyweight alternatives called OCALLs. All non-supported functions can be
mapped to OCALLs, but it is inefficient because of the low performance of OCALLs.
If enclaved software emulates some frequently used system calls, then the number
of issued heavyweight OCALLs decreases. However, this approach increases the
TCB size of enclaved software and thus, there is a tradeoff between the TCB size of
enclaved software and its performance. One can compare the frameworks from the
point of view of this tradeoff.
Haven [26] offered to use a full-fledged libOS inside enclaves. This libOS
implemented a maximum possible number of system calls and issued OCALLs only
when an operation could not be emulated inside an enclave. Haven shifted the tradeoff
to the side with low-intensive calls and a huge TCB. Graphene-SGX [27] followed the
same design but used the glibc library. SCONE [25] tried to minimise a TCB without
increasing the OCALL intensity. For that, SCONE used the lightweight musl library
and an asynchronous interface, which was based on queues [58] for communication
of trusted software and untrusted helpers. To prevent attacks of system software on
enclaved programs10, both SCONE and Haven checked the correctness of the values
returned by the untrusted helpers. Panoply [57] used synchronous calls, removed the
libc library from a TCB and mapped the POSIX interface to OCALLs. Thus, Panoply
shifted the tradeoff to the side with high-intensive calls and a minimalistic TCB.
10So called Iago attack [59]
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2.1.3.2 System support
Different works considered weaknesses of enclaves and developed system support
for them. These works can be separated into several groups.
Attacks
Various works considered security aspects of enclaves. Xu et al. [60] introduced
a SGX-specific type of side-channel attack called a controlled-channel attack. Enclaves
cannot control access rights of their own pages, and the malicious kernel can manipulate
these rights to enable page faults inside enclaves. By this, firstly, the kernel can track
sequences of page faults and thereby reconstruct the execution control flow, which
is possible even at instruction-level granularity [61]. Secondly, an attacker can also
retrieve enclaved data, and even extract cryptographic key bits from unmodified
versions of OpenSSL and Libgcrypt [61]. Thirdly, this approach can be used to stop the
execution of particular threads inside an enclave and thereby exploit use-after-free and
time-of-check-to-time-of-use bugs [62] in enclaved software. Enclaves can be protected
from these controlled-channel attacks by a software-only defence technique, but with
high performance overhead [63].
Additionally, enclaves are vulnerable to ordinary side-channel attacks11. Lee et
al. [64] implemented a branch shadowing attack which identified execution flows of
enclaved software. Schwarz et al. [65] and Moghimi et al. [66] demonstrated successful
Prime+Probe cache attacks on vulnerable cryptography libraries. These attacks required
an interrupt of execution of victim processes, which can be detected [67, 68]. However,
Brasser et al. [69] demonstrated an attack which does not require the interruptions.
Protection
Another group of works were aimed at the protection of enclaved software from
external attacks and exploitation of internal bugs. Chandra at al. introduced [70]
a defence strategy with reasonable performance degradation which added random
memory access to the existing program’s execution flow. These accesses added noises
to the execution pattern and made retrieving of the execution flow complicated.
ZeroTrace [71] presented more sophisticated oblivious memory services based on an
11Even to Spectre-like: https://github.com/lsds/spectre-attack-sgx
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oblivious block-level memory controller. SGXBounds [72] introduced an LLVM-based
compiler framework which added memory-safety for enclaved software written in
unsafe languages like C and C++. The framework uses the unused upper 32 bits of
64-bit pointers to store tags which define bounds of referenced objects and location of
additional metadata. SGXBounds uses these tags for runtime bounds checks of memory
access operations like store, load, etc. SGX-Shield [73] implemented randomisation of
in-enclave address space.
Performance
The research community also addressed the performance issues of enclaved
software. HotCalls [21] offered a hand-crafted busy-wait mechanism which enabled
concurrent access to shared objects inside an enclave without the use of sgx mutexes.
Switchless Calls [74, 75] introduced a similar busy-wait technique for asynchronous
invocations of enclaved functions. Eleos [22] introduced a programming language-based
paging mechanism which aimed at avoiding costly enclave exits. Vault [76] also
addressed the problem of memory paging and proposed Variable Arity Unified
encrypted-Leaf Tree – a data organisation structure which reduced the integrity tree
storage overhead and significantly decreased the impact of the EPC paging.
Functionality
Several works introduced a new functionality of enclaves. The hypervisor and the
kernel cannot access pages of enclaves and thus, they cannot provide enclave migration.
To overcome this drawback, Gu et al. developed [77] a software-based protocol which
implemented migration by enclaved software. Glamdring [78] introduced an automatic
source-level partitioning framework that enabled a split of applications written in C
into multiple parts, and secure them by enclaves. Weichbrodt et al. presented [79] a
framework for performance analysis of enclaved software.
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2.1.4 Conclusion
Two mainstream platforms for cloud computing have extensions for trusted
execution. AMD SEV offers trusted execution in the form of encrypted virtual machines,
while Intel offers the same in the form of new system components called SGX enclaves.
Enclaves are parts of user-space programs which are inaccessible by the privileged
software, other enclaves, and devices.
The programming of enclaves is accompanied by several challenges: enclaved
programs cannot have dependencies outside their own enclaves, transitions between
enclaves and untrusted software are very costly, and the performance of enclaved
programs can dramatically degrade because of page swapping. These challenges were
addressed by various research works aimed at the development of new programming
models and system support for enclaves. For example, the first and second challenges
were addressed in frameworks such as Haven [26], SCONE [25], Graphene-SGX [27]
and others. The frameworks enable execution of legacy programs inside enclaves and
offer primitives to reduce the transition costs. However, these projects do not fully use
the advantages of enclaves since all of them offer monolithic single enclave solutions. At
the same time, the Intel SGX architecture enables execution of multiple enclaves inside
a single process, thereby allowing development of applications which have multiple
trusted components. This programming model and the corresponding use cases are
considered in the following section.
The third challenge was addressed in the Eleos [22] framework. This framework
can mitigate the impact of hardware-based paging by the use of in-enclave
software-based paging. However, legacy programs cannot profit from this framework,
since it requires the redevelopment of the whole software. For some software systems,
like databases, this approach cannot be applied because of high software complexity
or incompatibility of the programming languages. Such programs require another
approach, which is considered in section 2.3.
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2.2 EActors: an actor-based framework for trusted
execution
Section 2.1 provided an overview of the Intel SGX architecture and various related
research projects. As shown, SGX enclaves are parts of user-space programs which
are inaccessible by privileged software, other enclaves or devices: only code located
inside the enclave can process data located inside the same enclave. Enclaves have
several shortcomings: transitions between enclaves and untrusted hardware are high
and memory used by all enclaves without page swapping is quite small. Despite
this, SGX enclaves enable trusted execution in untrusted environments and have
several additional features. One of them is the possibility to partition a single program
into multiple enclaves.
Indeed, a single process can host multiple enclaves, and therefore can isolate
and protect parts of the application from each other. In the case of intrusion into an
enclave, only code and data located inside this enclave will be compromised, while
other enclaves will be protected. An example of the applicability of such design can
be a secure instant messaging service with protected group chats. The processing of
messages inside different enclaves protects them, even if one enclave, or an untrusted
part of the application, is compromised.
The programming environment which is used to implement such use cases should
meet several requirements. Firstly, partitions of the application should have the minimal
TCB and different code bases. The huge TCB increases the probability of defects [80],
while the code reuse makes all enclaves vulnerable if the code has a flaw. Secondly,
the environment should provide an efficient mechanism for data exchange between
partitions. In addition to this, the environment should be aware of the aforementioned
shortcomings of enclaves.
Based on section 2.1, one can identify two generalised programming approaches
for development of enclaved applications. The first one is offered by the Intel SGX SDK.
This SDK provides primitives for co-development of trusted and untrusted programs:
a developer defines functions which should be located inside enclaves, and then can
invoke them in an RPC-like way. While the SDK provides the necessary instruments
to program enclaves, this programming approach has several shortcomings from the
point of view of multi-enclave applications:
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Costly enclave interaction: The SGX SDK offers an Enclave Description Language
(EDL) to define interfaces between enclaves and untrusted software. These interfaces
use heavyweight ECALLs and OCALLs, which are more than 50 times slower than
ordinary system calls [74].
Hardcoded partitioning: The code generation process of the SGX SDK requires explicit
definition of which code needs to be located inside a trusted area, and which needs to
be located inside an untrusted one. This separation limits a developer in further design
and deployment decisions.
Costly synchronisations: The SGX SDK offers a mutex-like synchronisation primitive
which allows synchronising access to shared data (section 2.1.2.1). However, threads
cannot be suspended by the kernel inside an enclave when waiting for a condition to be
fulfilled. As a consequence, either spin-locking needs to be performed or the thread has
to leave the enclave, which requires the use of heavyweight ECALLs and OCALLs.
The second programming approach is proposed by projects like Haven [26],
SCONE [25], Graphene-SGX [27] and Panoply [57]. In these projects, an enclave is
considered as an environment for execution of legacy programs. A tiny shim layer, or
a library OS, is located inside an enclave and provides a kernel (or more high level)
Application Programming Interface (API) to an enclaved program. Only a small number
of functions can be fully implemented inside an enclave, and thus, this layer should
interact with untrusted helpers. In the context of multi-enclave programming, this
approach increases the TCB size of enclaved partitions, only partly12 solves the issues of
costly synchronisations and transitions, does not have fast inter-enclave communication
primitives, and has a hardcoded monolithic partitioning.
This section presents an alternative programming approach based on ideas of actors.
An actor as a computation entity which can, in reaction to a received message, send
messages to other actors [81]. As a result, multiple actors can work concurrently and do
not possess a shared execution state, which avoids the use of heavy synchronisation
primitives (section 2.1.2) and prevents exploitation of synchronisation-based bugs [62].
This programming model requires the development of a special programming
framework, since existing ones, such as the CAF framework [82] or Akka [83], do
12SCONE offers an asynchronous interface and user-level threading
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not support SGX enclaves. These frameworks are not designed for trusted execution
and have heavyweight runtimes, the porting of which to enclaves is challenging.
This section introduces the EActors framework – a programming framework which
inherits the actor-based programming model and is built from scratch in accordance
with Intel SGX features. The section is organised as follows. Section 2.2.1 provides the
general overview of the framework: the programming model, definition of entities,
life-cycles of actors and more. Section 2.2.2 covers architectural and implementation
details of various components, such as communication primitives and system actors.
Section 2.2.3 is devoted to architecture of use cases: a microbenchmark, a secure
multi-party computation service, and an EActors-based XMPP messaging service.
Section 2.2.4 presents evaluation of the framework and the use cases. Section 2.2.5
discusses related works, while section 2.2.6 summarises the section.
2.2.1 General architecture and basic primitives
The EActors framework offers an actor-inspired programming model. An actor is
a computation entity which can, in reaction to a received message, send messages to
other actors. The framework has the following design goals in response to the identified
shortcomings of the SGX SDK and existing frameworks:
Messaging The EActors framework enables fast message exchange between
eactors13. This especially applies for eactors communication across enclave
boundaries, which facilitates the use of multiple enclaves.
Lock avoidance The EActors programming model avoids costly synchronisation
because actors do not rely on a shared state but instead exchange messages.
Flexibility The EActors framework offers a flexible use of trusted execution. It
separates the code of an eactor, which is implemented in a standard programming
language, from the associated deployment policy. This policy defines the
assignment of a given eactor to computational resources (i.e., CPU cores, threads)
and especially to enclaves. This is facilitated by providing uniform communication
primitives which transparently select adequate communication mechanisms,
regardless where an eactor is placed (i.e., inside or outside of an enclave) or
13The notion of actors inside the EActors framework
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1 s t r u c t s t a t e { s t r u c t channel chan [ 2 ] ; i n t f i r s t ;}
2
3 void aping ( s t r u c t a c t o r ∗ s e l f ) {
4 i f ( s e l f−>s t a t e−> f i r s t ) {
5 s e l f−>s t a t e−> f i r s t = 0 ;
6 } e lse {
7 /∗ r e c e i v e a pong ∗ /
8 char∗ msg = recv (& s e l f−>channel [ 0 ] ) ;
9 i f (msg == NULL)
10 return ;
11 }
12 /∗ send a ping ∗ /
13 send(& s e l f−>channel [ 1 ] , ”ping” ) ;
14 }
15
16 void a p i n g c t r ( s t r u c t a c t o r ∗ s e l f ) {
17 s e l f−>s t a t e−> f i r s t = 1 ;
18 connect ( s e l f−>channel [ 0 ] ) ;
19 }
Listing (2.1) Pseudo-Code of an eactor
with whom it communicates. As a result, an eactor can be deployed either in or
outside of an enclave without further modifications to its application logic.
The reminder of this subsection provides an overview of each of these goals and
demonstrates how they are applied in the framework.
2.2.1.1 EActors programming model
The EActors framework features a lean actor programming model. In order to
implement an eactor, a developer has to provide the body function of the actor, which
contains the application logic and a constructor function. The purpose of the latter is
to initialise communication channels to other eactors and initialise the private state of
the eactor at startup time. Thus, connections are in essence statically assigned to avoid
additional naming and resolving mechanisms with the aim of a small TCB.
Listing 2.1 presents a simplified example of an eactor written in C. The PING
eactor sends a ping message when it receives a pong message from a PONG eactor. The
latter works analogously to the presented example. The structure state declares the
private state of the actor, the aping function is the body function, and the aping ctr
is the constructor. Once called by the runtime, the constructor function initialises
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Figure 2.9: Deployment of eactors, workers, and enclaves
the field first to 1 (line 17), and connects the PING eactor to a PONG eactor via the
communication channel 0 provided by the runtime (line 18). Next, the EActors runtime
regularly executes the body of the eactor. When the runtime executes aping for the first
time (line 4), aping simply generates an initial ping message (line 13) in order to start
the ping/pong message exchange. Each time the body function aping of the eactor is
executed, either a message is received via the channel and ping is emitted, or the eactor
simply returns because no data needs to be processed.
2.2.1.2 EActors runtime
At its core, the EActors runtime enables mapping of computational resources in
terms of CPUs and threads to eactors. More importantly, it allows defining whether an
eactor should be executed in a trusted execution context (i.e. an enclave) or as a part of
the untrusted application. As a result, the use of multiple enclaves is supported.
Figure 2.9 illustrates an example deployment. It defines eactors (A1, A2, PING and
PONG) and two enclaves. The A1 and the PING eactors are located in the first enclave,
while the A2 and the PONG eactors are located in the second enclave. To execute these
eactors, three workers are utilised.
A worker is a framework abstraction to manage a POSIX thread. The first worker
is bound to CPUs 0 and 1, and executes the A1 and the A2 eactors in round-robin.
The second worker is bound to CPU 2 and executes only the PING eactor, while the
third worker is bound to CPU 4 and executes only the PONG eactor. If all eactors
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assigned to a worker are confined to the same enclave, the worker does not leave
the enclave (e.g. Worker#2 for the PING eactor). Otherwise, as in case of the A1 and
the A2 eactors, the worker has to migrate from enclave to enclave in order to execute
the body functions, which will result in costly execution mode transitions. Such an
approach should usually be avoided but can be used if eactors are dispersed over
multiple enclaves and infrequently activated.
Infrequently activated actors can use another feature of the framework: temporary
self-deactivation. Enclaved eactors cannot be suspended inside enclaves and thus,
the CPU becomes overloaded by such eactors, which unsuccessfully try to dequeue
incoming messages in most cases. To prevent overloading, an eactor can request
the runtime to disable its own invocation for some invocation cycles. During this
time, the corresponding worker invokes other eactors, or leaves the enclave for a
pre-defined short period if all its own eactors are self-deactivated. This technique
significantly decreases the performance overhead caused by idle eactors and contributes
to scalability of framework-based applications.
To implement the outlined scenario, plus more complex ones, a developer defines
the necessary mapping of computational resources and trusted execution contexts of
eactors in a special configuration file. This file builds the basis for a custom build
process and leads to the generation of the source tree of a project. The tree includes
source code of all actors and components of the framework. Compiled together with the
SGX SDK, the source tree generates binaries with untrusted applications and enclaves
that implement the envisioned deployment. During this process, the building system
also extracts measurements14 from the compiled enclaves and embeds these values into
structures responsible for local attestation and establishment of encrypted connections.
Section 2.2.2.1 and section 2.2.3.2 describe this process in detail.
When the application is started, the generated EActors runtime creates the
enclaves, allocates private memory regions, calls the constructors of the actors, and
creates, as well as starts, the workers. Each worker then executes the body functions
of its assigned eactors.
14See section 2.1.1.2
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2.2.1.3 Memory management and messaging
As mentioned previously, eactors use messages for communication. To provide
this, the EActors framework has three basic primitives called pools, mboxes and nodes.
A node is a memory object which consists of two elements: a header and a payload. The
payload is a memory region used to transfer eactors messages. The header consists
of multiple data pointers to manage nodes. A pool is an abstraction which refers
to a set of empty nodes. The framework preallocates private and public pools at
system start. A mbox is an abstraction which refers to a set of linked nodes used for
message exchange. Mboxes and pools are organised in the form of bi-direction double
linked lists implemented on top of Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) [84] (Figure 2.10).
They have different APIs and semantics: mboxes offer FIFO semantic, while pools
implement LIFO semantic.
To send a message, an eactor needs to dequeue an empty node from a pool, fill its
payload, and enqueue it to a FIFO mbox (Figure 2.11). At the same time, another eactor,
tries to dequeue the message node from the mbox. Upon success, the second eactor
retrieves the payload and can return the used node back to the pool.
2.2.2 Design and implementation of system components
To facilitate applicability, scalability and flexibility of eactors-based applications,
the EActors framework provides the support of three high-level components: a unified
communication layer, system actors, and an Eactors Object Store (EOS). The following
subsections consider these components.
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2.2.2.1 Connectors and cargos
Mbox is a universal primitive for communication of eactors. These eactors can be
located inside a single or multiple enclaves and thus, communication can be public or
private. Public communication uses pools and mboxes located inside untrusted memory,
while private communication uses the same located inside an enclave. Additionally,
communication can be encrypted and non-encrypted.
Assigning of actors to enclaves is defined by a configuration file and thus, switching
between encrypted/non-encrypted and public/private implementation should be
hidden from the actor’s source code. Mboxes cannot provide the necessary unified
communication layer because encrypted and plaintext data are transferred in different
ways.
payload[] =
”Hello world”
Header
PRODUCER
∗ptr = payload
CONSUMER
∗ptr = payload
Enclave #1 Enclave #2
node
(a) Plaintext data transfer
payload[] =
&%A(/oK#
Header
PRODUCER
src[] =
”HelloWorld”
CONSUMER
dst[] =
”HelloWorld”
Enclave #1 Enclave #2
node
encryption decryption
(b) Encrypted data transfer
Figure 2.12: Different forms of data transfer
As mentioned previously, to transfer a plaintext message from one eactor
(producer) to another eactor (consumer), the producer needs to pop an empty message
node from a pool, fill the payload of the node, and then push the node into a mbox of the
consumer. The consumer, in turn, needs to pop the message from the mbox, and then it
can access the payload. Data access of both participants is performed via pointers: both
the producer and the consumer can access the payload of the node directly (Figure 2.12a).
In sum, the single data transfer requires one memcpy operation (to fill the payload),
and four enqueue/dequeue operations (to allocate, to send, to receive and to return).
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The data transfer of an encrypted message is different. A fresh node obtained by
the pop operation cannot be used directly as a non-encrypted one can. Instead, the
producer needs to allocate a shadow buffer (src[ ]) in the trusted address space, place
data to send (”Hello world”) within, and then encrypt the data into the node’s payload
(Figure 2.12b). Upon receiving, the consumer also needs to allocate a shadow buffer
(dst[ ]) inside its own trusted address space and within it, decrypt the payload of the
incoming message.
This need for the shadow buffer allocation makes use of mbox inflexible because
different types of communication require different methods and data structures. To
overcome this inflexibility, the connectors and cargos were developed.
Design
The connector is an abstraction which describes a unified communication layer
between two actors. The cargo is an object which carries a message from one actor to
another via a connector. Connectors can create, send, receive and return cargos. These
entities are considered in detail below.
A connector consists of several components (Figure 2.13). Firstly, it includes two
pointers to mboxes (*IN and *OUT), and one pointer to a pool (*GPOOL). These mboxes and
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the pool should be accessible by both actors involved in message exchange. Secondly, a
connector includes an encryption context (key). This contains encryption keys used for
message encryption. A connector also includes a flag field (F), which defines the type of
the connector: plaintext or encrypted.
The cargo is a compound object which contains a message. Firstly, a cargo includes
the pointer to the connector which produced it (*connector). A cargo can be sent or
returned only by the connector which created the cargo. Secondly, a cargo has a pointer
to a node used for a data transfer (*node). Thirdly, a cargo has a data pointer *data,
which points to the node’s payload or to the shadow buffer.
If a connector has an encryption flag, it produces encrypted cargos. In an encrypted
cargo, the *data points to the shadow buffer (green line), which is allocated inside
trusted memory. The outgoing data will be taken from this shadow buffer and encrypted
into a message node when the cargo is sent. In contrast, when the connector receives a
cargo, it decrypts the content into its own shadow buffer. Plaintext connectors, in turn,
produce plaintext cargos, and data pointers of these directly point to a payload of their
own nodes (blue line).
Types of connectors, as well as pointers to pools and mboxes, are provided by the
developer at compilation time. These configurations are assigned to connectors at the
construction phase and should not be changed during the execution. Manipulations
with internal shadow buffers and pointers are transparent for a developer and eactors.
As a consequence, this approach does not require modification of the eactor’s body
function when the type of a connector changes. A developer only needs to change the
type of a connector, which can be done in the eactor’s constructor.
Key-exchange procedure
The framework uses the AES-128-GCM algorithm with an incremental initialisation
vector to message encryption. Thus, each pair of encrypted connectors needs to have
the same pair of 128-bit variables, an encryption key and an initialisation vector. These
are generated during the special key-exchange procedure based on local attestation.
The key-exchange procedure involves two connectors and is performed by
constructors of actors located inside different enclaves. The first constructor and its
connector have the MASTER role, while the second constructor and its connector have
the SLAVE role. Constructors exchange messages via these connectors as follows:
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Figure 2.14: Chaining of local attestation
1. MASTER generates a pair of keys used for AES-GCM, retrieves the measurement
of its own enclave and sends it to SLAVE.
2. SLAVE generates a pair of RSA keys, receives the measurement and generates a
local attestation report with this measurement. This report also includes a hash of
the public RSA key. Then SLAVE sends the report with the public key to MASTER.
3. MASTER receives, verifies the report, and compares the SLAVE’s measurement
with the expected value. If the these measurements match, then MASTER encrypts
by the public RSA key the AES-GCM keys, and sends them to SLAVE.
4. SLAVE receives the encrypted message, decrypts it and initialises the encryption
context of the connector.
The building system automatically generates measurements of all (except one)
enclaves. However, since these values can be extracted only from compiled enclaves,
the building system cannot provide the same table with measurements for all enclaves:
the first compiled enclave cannot have the measurement of the second compiled enclave
if the second compiled enclave includes the measurement of the first enclave. In other
words, in a pair of enclaves, only one enclave can attest the other one. Meanwhile, the
building process enables chaining of attestation, as depicted in Figure 2.14. The order
of the chain is defined by the order in which enclaves are compiled. For example, the
framework firstly compiles the E4 enclave, and thus, stored inside it connectors can
have only the SLAVE role. The last compiled enclave (E1) includes measurements of all
other enclaves (MR2, MR3, MR4), therefore, its actors can attest all other enclaves.
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Figure 2.15: Interactions of enclaved actors with network system actors
2.2.2.2 System actors
Enclaved eactors cannot directly interact with the kernel. This requires the use of
ECALLs and OCALLs, which are forbidden in the framework. Instead, this functionality
is provided by system actors.
System actors are the special actors which execute in the untrusted area and
provide mechanisms – system calls. The framework provides several system actors,
which can be grouped by subsystems: networking (socket(), bind()), memory (mmap(),
munmap(), mprotect()), input/output (open(), close(), read(), write(), etc.). Each
system actor provides only one mechanism and follows a similar pattern of work:
a system actor receives a specially prepared message from eactors, performs its
mechanism on arguments stored inside the message, and sends the results back. The
message includes arguments for the mechanism and a mbox where results should be
returned. To decrease the overhead caused by the intensive messaging, system actors
support batched requests.
Two features of system actors increase their performance and scalability. Firstly, all
system actors are stateless actors, i.e. they do not store any data between invocations.
Thus, any system actor can handle any request from any other eactor. As a consequence,
the framework can be configured to spawn multiple system actors, attached to different
workers, with the same mechanisms. Secondly, all system actors use non-blocking calls.
In particular, for network actors, this means, that instead of waiting for an incoming
message via the select() or the poll() system calls (and thus block the worker), a
network actor can access sockets by non-blocking read(), and if there is no incoming
event, the actor indicates this in the return message.
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Scalability of network actors
The design of system actors enables communication of trusted actors with clients
over connection-agnostic network actors (Figure 2.15). In accordance with performance
requirements, a developer can spawn any number of network actors assigned to any
number of workers. For example, if a system needs to consume more network traffic
than what is produced, the framework can be configured to spawn more READER actors
than WRITER actors. This approach is used in the XMPP service (section 2.2.3.3) to
increase the performance of a network-intensive application.
2.2.2.3 Eactors Object Store
Sometimes actors should store large quantities of data and have concurrent access
to it. For example, a group of actors process a stream of images and one actor extracts
features that need to be used by other actors. These features can be sent via messages
to all other actors, but the messaging overhead grows with the number of actors. To
prevent this overhead, modern actor-based frameworks use shared atomic objects stores.
For example, Erlang offers an Erlang Term Store15, tables of which can be accessed by
different actors. With this approach, the actor only needs to upload features inside a
store, while other actors will read them later from the store.
The EActors framework also offers a mechanism to store large volumes of data
with concurrent access named the Eactors Object Store (EOS) API. The EOS API is a set
of functions and system actors which can be used to turn a chunk of memory into an
objects store. This chunk of memory can be located inside an enclave, and therefore
the corresponding object store is private and accessed only by actors located inside
the enclave. Alternatively, this chunk of memory can be located in untrusted memory.
Accordingly, the corresponding store is public and accessed by all actors. A public EOS
can be encrypted or non-encrypted, as well as persistent or non-persistent. Meanwhile,
all private EOSs are non-encrypted and non-persistent.
Design
The EOS design inherits the general ideas of the EActors framework. It uses
actor’s features to provide concurrent access to stored data to different actors located in
different enclaves.
15http://erlang.org/doc/man/ets.html
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Figure 2.16: Internal structure of an Eactors Object Store
Figure 2.16 shows the design of a store. In essence, an EOS is a Key-Value Store
(KVS). This KVS is split into several baskets (B1–B32). The key-value content of the store
is distributed over these baskets by hash values of keys. Each basket is an atomic stack16
and thus, multiple readers and writers can concurrently access the store. Elements of
the stacks are nodes filled by the key-value pairs (KVP#1, KVP#2). These nodes are
taken from the store node pool (POOL), which is also an atomic stack.
In addition to the store pool and baskets, an EOS has several other components. The
first is the Super block, which contains information about the size of the store, its version,
and some technical information. Secondly, the EOS may include encryption keys, which
can be stored in a sealed form inside the dedicated region of the EOS. Thirdly, the EOS
includes the Grace counters, a data field used in the garbage collection process.
Any chunk of memory17 can be used as an EOS. For this it needs to be initialised
and this process consists of several steps. Firstly, the EOS API initialises internal
structures of the future EOS, such as grace counters and baskets. Then the framework
converts all free pages of the memory chunk into nodes, and pushes them into the EOS’
pool. After that, the EOS can be used by actors via the set(k,v) and the get(k) operations
provided by the framework.
Set operation
Insertion of data into a KVS by an actor requires three steps. Firstly, the actor
needs to obtain an empty node of the store. If the store has an empty node, it can be
16Technically, all baskets are implemented as pools, i.e. HLE queues with the LIFO semantic
17A memory chunk should have enough space for 32 empty nodes and the metadata header
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obtained by the pop operation applied to the store atomic pool. After the successful pop
operation, the actor gets exclusive access to the node. During the second step, the actor
fills the node with key-value data. In the third step, the actor atomically pushes the filled
node into one of the EOS’s baskets. The number of the basket is identified by the hash
function applied to the key of the pair.
Get operation
As can be seen, a basket consists of several versions of key-value pairs (Figure 2.17).
However, an actor does not need to ’walk’ over the whole stack to find the latest
key-value pair. Since baskets of an EOS are atomic stacks, the most recent key-value
pairs are always on the top of the baskets, and the first match of keys belongs to the
recent key-value pair.
To get a value for the requested key, an actor needs to perform two steps. Firstly,
the actor needs to identify the basket which stores the requested key-value pair by
computing a hash sum of the key. Secondly, the actor walks from the top (read top in the
figure) of the basket over all nodes and compares stored keys with the requested key.
The first match (K1V2) of the key is the requested pair. At the same time, other actors
can push new values into this stack (1 and 2), but this data is invisible since it lies above
the read top.
B1 B32... ∗top
K7V1 K1V3... K1V2 K1V1
2 1
read top
Figure 2.17: Example of a get(K1) operation
This approach has several advantages and disadvantages. The insertion of new
values is fast and has constant speed. The retrieval of the stored data depends on the
data update rate. Rarely updated data requires more time to retrieve compared to that
which is frequently updated. Moreover, since baskets include old versions of key-value
pairs, the store can be easily overflowed. Old versions of key-value pairs need to be
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removed from the store, but this can happen only when these pairs are not accessed by
readers. The Grace counters and the Drop list solve this issue.
Grace counters and Drop lists
One of the important aspects of the use of concurrent data structures is safe removal
of outdated elements. An element should not be in use during removal, otherwise, the
removal may corrupt the data.
Example: Two eactors use one EOS. The first eactor, named WRITER, periodically
writes key-value pairs with the same key and different values into the store. The second
eactor, named READER, reads pairs from the store. The third eactor, named CLEANER,
needs to remove outdated objects from the store to prevent overflow.
The READER actor is accessing a key-value pair. At the same time, the WRITER actor
has added a new key-value pair into the EOS. Thus, at this moment, two key-value
pairs exist inside the EOS, and one of them is garbage, which needs to be removed by
the CLEANER actor. For this, the CLEANER actor (1) needs to identify the old key-value
pair and (2) remove it from the basket only when the READER has stopped using it.
The simplest solution is to attach all eactors to the same worker. In this case,
there is no race condition – all actors are invoked sequentially and there is no situation
when the CLEANER actor removes an object in use. However, if the actors are attached to
different workers, the system becomes concurrent.
There are several approaches to track data in use. For example, some garbage
collection algorithms control reference counters [85] to a shared object, and release the
object only when no one references the object anymore. Read-Copy Update scheme,
implemented in the Linux kernel, separates two phases of shared objects use: the removal
phase and the reclamation phase. The removal phase removes an object from a shared
structure, while the reclamation phase is actual freeing of the object, which happens later,
after a grace period. The duration of the grace period should be enough to guarantee
that all possible concurrent threads have left the critical section, and the removed object
is not used anymore.
The framework has its own mechanism of object reclamation, which partly
combines both approaches. This mechanism is enabled by two fundamental features of
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the framework. Firstly, all eactors are non-blocking entities. They cannot block their
own execution and thus, cannot access a shared object for an unlimited amount of time.
Secondly, baskets of the EOS are organised in stacks: the recent key-value pairs are
always located on the top of a basket.
Applying this to the previous example: if the fresh key-value pair is inserted into
the EOS while the READER actor accesses the previous values, another actor will read
the recent pair, even if the following read takes place immediately after the end of the
previous operation. Consequently, the CLEANER actor should neither wait for a grace
period (which is impossible, because there is no trusted time source) nor track references
to the data (because of the data access pattern). Instead, the CLEANER actor just needs to
have a list of outdated objects and make sure that all actors involved in interaction with
the EOS have made at least one iteration of their own execution.
Drop list L1 L2
B32
K1V3 K1V2 K1V1
Figure 2.18: Example: Drop list includes pointers to outdated pairs
The process of reclamation of outdated objects consists of three components.
Firstly, each actor that accesses the EOS needs to be registered with the store. During the
registration, each actor receives its own slot inside the EOS’s grace counters. An actor
which deals with the EOS needs to update its own grace counter on each invocation
of its body function. By comparing the grace counter’s values, one can identify the
moment when all actors have processed their own body functions at least once.
Secondly, the set(k,v) operation requires special continuation after the insertion of a
key-value pair. During the continuation, an actor which performed the insertion needs
to find a previous element of the basket with the same key. The actor cannot remove
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this element from the stack since it can be in use. Instead, the actor adds a pointer to
this element into the Drop list (Figure 2.18).
Thirdly, a system actor named CLEANER periodically checks the Drop list. If the
CLEANER actor detects a new pointer in the list (L2, for example), it waits until all counters
inside the grace list change their values, then removes the referenced element (K1V1)
from the basket (B32), and then removes the corresponding pointer (L2) from the list.
The framework does not guarantee that the CLEANER actor removes objects faster
than new objects appear. However, the design of the framework enables a delay of
inserts: after an unsuccessful insertion attempt, the actor can repeat the attempt during
the next execution iteration. Moreover, in accordance with the store role, the Drop list
can be disabled, as can the CLEANER actor and grace counters.
Encryption of objects
The EOS API supports encryption of key-value pairs. The encryption key is stored
in a private compartment of actors and disseminated via encrypted cargos. The choice
of baskets in encrypted EOSs is made by a hash value of the deterministically encrypted
key. To retrieve an encrypted key-value pair, an actor does not decrypt all stored objects.
Instead, it encrypts the requested key and performs a search in baskets by comparison
of the encrypted key with stored objects. Additionally, to preserve the integrity of the
pairs, the EOS API does not store the keys and the values separately, but stores the
encrypted pairs as combined values.
Persistence on demand
The design of the EOS API allows a developer to create a persistent public EOS,
i.e. a store, objects of which survive a system restart. For this, the framework can
use a memory mapped file instead of allocation of virtual memory for an EOS. An
EOS located inside this memory region becomes persistent without the use of the
input/output system actors or ECALLs.
Two features of a system make this approach possible. Firstly, enclaved software
can access not only the enclave’s address space but the whole virtual memory range of
the host process except the virtual addresses of other enclaves (section 2.1). Secondly,
interaction with secondary storage in the Linux kernel is implemented via the page
cache [86], pages of which can be mapped into a process address space via the mmap
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system call [87]. Thus, one can map a file or a storage device to a virtual address and
then, an enclaved software can modify the storage content in the same way, as it can
modify any memory object located inside untrusted memory. The mechanisms for
mapping of files (mmap(), munmap()) and data syncing (fsync()) are provided by the
corresponding system actors.
The framework does not protect persistent EOSs against reboot and fork attacks.
However, this could be addressed by adopting an approach such as LCM [88] or
ROTE [89].
2.2.3 Microbenchmark and use cases
One microbenchmark and two use cases were implemented on top of the
EActors framework: (i) a microbenchmark of inter-enclave communication, (ii) a
secure multi-party computation (SMC) service, and (iii) a secure instant messaging
service. All feature the use of multiple enclaves and differently exercise the core
components of the framework. The microbenchmark compares the message-based
communication interface of the framework with the ECALL interface provided by the
SGX SDK. The SMC service demonstrates how mutually-distrusting parties can securely
perform computations without revealing the individual secret values. Additionally,
this service benchmarks encrypted cargos. The secure instant messaging service, in
turn, demonstrates how the framework can be used to partition an application which
processes data of clients. This service actively uses system actors and the EOS API.
2.2.3.1 Microbenchmarking inter-enclave communication
The pingpong microbenchmark consists of PING and PONG actors. The PING sends
a message to the PONG, and the PONG replies to the PING with a message. Two variants
of pingpong were compared: an EActor-based implementation and a native SGX
SDK-based approach. Figure 2.19 depicts differences in these implementations.
As can be seen in the figure, in the native SGX SDK-based scenario, the PING and
the PONG components are located inside different enclaves. To send a message, the PING
issues the OCALL to leave its own enclave, and then issues the ECALL to enter into the
enclave of the PONG. After the entry, the PING needs to deliver a message, and then leave
the PONG enclave and re-enter its own enclave. The PONG, at the same time, after the
receiving the message, repeats the same sequence of actions and sends the answer to the
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Figure 2.19: Design of microbenchmark scenarios
PING. Because both actors have their own contexts (pthreads), the data exchange needs
to be protected. A simple spin-lock [90] was used for the data access synchronisations.
In the framework-based scenario, the PING and PONG are designed as two eactors
located inside two different enclaves. Here, eactors’s threads are bound to different
CPU cores, and non-encrypted mboxes are used.
2.2.3.2 Secure multi-party computation service
Several protocols which enforce secure multi-party computations are provided
in the literature. A secure sum protocol [91, 92] has been chosen for the framework
evaluation. This protocol aims at securely computing the sum of all the inputs of a set
of participants without revealing the individual values.
Protocol description
The original protocol was slightly improved for the use case. Firstly, the original
protocol targets a distributed setting where the individual participants exchange
messages over the network. With the support of trusted execution, all participants
can be represented by enclaves which are co-located on a single machine. This way,
the costly network-based communication between the participants can be avoided.
Secondly, the use case generalises the original protocol by performing the sum of
private vectors instead of individual values.
Figure 2.20 shows the general scheme of a secure-sum service. In this figure, k
parties (i.e., P1, P2,..,PK), are connected to each other in a ring structure. Each party
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Secret = [s11, s12, . . . , s1N]
Rnd = [r1, r2, . . . , rN]
m1 = [s11 + r1, s12 + r2, . . . , s1N + rN]
Sum = [mK1 − r1,mK2 − r2, . . . ,mKN − rN]
Secret = [s21, s22, . . . , s2N]
m2 = [s21 +m11, s22 +m12, . . . , s2N +m1N]
P3
P(K-1)
..
.
Secret = [sK1, sK2, . . . , sKN]
mK = [sK1 +m(K − 1)1, sK2 +m(K − 1)2, . . . , sKN +m(K − 1)N]
enc(m1)
enc(m2)
enc(m(K− 1))
enc(mK)
P1
P2
PK
Figure 2.20: General scheme of the SGX-based secure multi-party sum
has its own enclave and stores a secret input vector (Secret). On demand, the SMC
scheme computes the sum of the secret vectors. To do that, the first party P1 starts by
generating a vector of random values Rnd of the same size as the secret vector. Then,
P1 generates a message vector m1, which is the sum of Rnd and the secret vector Secret.
After encryption, this message is delivered to the second party P2. The second party
decrypts the message, adds it to its own secret vector, encrypts the resulting message
and sends it to the next party in the ring. This process is repeated until the last party PK
delivers the mK message to the first party P1. Finally, the P1 computes the result of the
sum by subtracting the Rnd vector from the latest received vector mK. This result is then
shared among all the participants.
Design
To highlight the benefits of the EActors framework, two different variants of this
protocol were designed (Figure 2.21. The left part of the figure shows the SMC use case
implemented with EActors while the right part shows the same use case implemented
with the SGX SDK. In the first case, each party is implemented as an independent
actor with its own worker and an SGX enclave image. In the second case, each party is
also implemented as an SGX enclave but only a single thread executes the protocol by
entering and leaving one enclave after another.
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Figure 2.21: Different implementations of the secure sum protocol
The threat model of the SMC sum protocol is based on an assumption that all
parties are mutually-distrusted. Thus, a malicious party or an adversary would try to
listen to the network or messages to obtain the temporary sum or guess any secret value.
Encrypted connectors prevent this, since each pair of connectors have its own encryption
key stored inside an enclave, and parties are attested during the key exchange procedure
(see section 2.2.2.1). The former prevents the leakage of intermediate sum values while
the latter guarantees that only expected parties are involved in the SMC sum.
2.2.3.3 XMPP instant messaging service
Instant messaging is used to exchange privacy-sensitive information. Trusted
execution builds a means to make it more secure. Accordingly, an EActors-based
variant of an instant messaging service that exercises all the outlined features were
designed and implemented. Besides security based on the use of multiple enclaves,
performance and scalability were prime design goals.
The developed instant messaging service implements core parts of the Extensible
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) protocol [93] and supports two types of
communication: One-to-One (O2O) and One-to-Many (O2M). The O2O type allows
end-to-end encrypted messaging between two participants which resembles the de facto
approach for modern messengers [94]. In principle, this type of connection can be
managed inside a single enclave as only the information regarding online users and
statistics has to be secure. For the One-to-Many (O2M) type, the situation is different as
it offers support for group chats. Here, the server decrypts the messages of each user
and re-encrypts for each member of the group. While a single enclave could also be
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Figure 2.22: XMPP service architecture
used in principle, the implementation supports a dedicated enclave for each group chat
to improve isolation.
Architecture
Figure 2.22 shows the architecture of the XMPP service. The service includes
various components: system actors, the set of XMPP actors, a queue for data exchange
between actors, and more. Below, each component is considered independently.
Actors The XMPP service includes three groups of actors. Firstly, there are several
system actors (section 2.2.2.2). The service uses ACCEPTOR and CLOSER actors. The
former, at the construction phase, opens a TCP/IP socket18, and then during the active
execution, accepts incoming connections (accept()) by requests. The latter is used to
close a connection. Additionally, the service spawns multiple READER and WRITER actors
18Calls socket(), bind(), and listen() system calls
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in accordance with performance needs. These system actors are used to receive and
send data via a TCP/IP socket.
Secondly, there is a CONNECTOR actor, the main function of which is the connections
control. This actor periodically sends requests to the ACCEPTOR actor to accept incoming
connections. After acceptance of a connection, the CONNECTOR actor adds a description of
this connection into the Online list. The Online list is a pool with one writer (CONNECTOR)
and multiple readers (XMPP actors).
Thirdly, there is an XMPP actor, which implements an XMPP server function. This
actor interacts with clients, obtained from the Online list, by sending requests to READER
and WRITER actors. It is the ’heart’ of the service since it implements communication
between XMPP clients. Similarly to READER and WRITER actors, the service can be
configured to spawn multiple XMPP actors to increase the performance of the service.
Application specific components The service includes several application-specific
components. The first is the Online list mentioned above. This list is located inside
untrusted memory and shared by the CONNECTOR actor and all XMPP actors. The
CONNECTOR actor pushes the descriptors of incoming connections into this list. Idle
XMPP actors, in turn, concurrently pop the descriptors one-by-one and process them
inside their own enclaves.
The second component is the Private List of Clients (PLC). Each XMPP actor interacts
with clients, which are described by the client abstractions stored inside a PLC. A client
abstraction includes various elements, for example a TCP/IP socket of the client, the
current state of the client in accordance with the XMPP client model, an encryption
context, and more.
Additionally, there is the EOS, which is used by all XMPP actors (not depicted in
Figure 2.22). It stores information about currently opened connections like the binding
of a particular JabberID (JID) and the corresponding network socket.
Resource assignment The minimal configuration of the XMPP server includes: one
CONNECTOR actor with a pair of ACCEPTOR and CLOSER actors, and one XMPP actor with a
pair of READER and WRITER actors. For simplicity, the first group is named the CAC group,
while the second one is named the XRW group. The XMPP service scales horizontally by
increasing the number of XRW groups.
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Key features of the design
The XMPP service is designed in accordance with a major goal – scalability. The
service should be horizontally scaleable, i.e. the performance of the system should grow
while increasing the number of XMPP actors. The following paragraphs describe how
this goal was reflected in the design of the XMPP service.
Scalability By design, the network actors are stateless and symmetric. Any network
actor can be used by any XMPP actors. Thus, one, two, or any number of XMPP actors can
use any number of network actors. The microbenchmark was developed to estimate the
performance of the services with different configurations of actors. It demonstrated that
the maximum performance was achieved when a single XMPP actor is used together with
two READER and WRITER actors. Moreover, the XMPP actor should use its own worker,
while the READER and WRITER actors should share a single worker. In sum, the overall
design of the service is based on the idea that the horizontal scalability is achieved by
increasing the number of XMPP actors, which are coupled with READER and WRITER actors.
Information about connections All incoming connections are dynamically assigned
to XMPP actors. These XMPP actors can be located in different enclaves to ensure
isolation. While XMPP actors are independent, they still need to have the ability to
exchange data between each other.
Example: There are two clients which are connected to the same XMPP server. These
clients are served by different XMPP actors located inside different enclaves. Each XMPP
actor has a client abstraction of the corresponding client. This client abstraction is stored
inside a PLC, and includes information about the JID and the TCP/IP socket of the
client. However, to send a message from the first to the second client, the actor which
serves the first client needs to have access to the data stored in the enclave of the second
XMPP actor, which is impossible.
Shared access to connection information from different enclaves is provided by an
EOS. In a case of multi-enclave setup, this EOS is located inside untrusted memory and
stores encrypted data. Enclaved XMPP actors have concurrent access to this data and do
not require any synchronisation mechanisms or complex message exchange protocol.
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In the case of a single enclave setup, this EOS is located inside the enclave and stores
data non-encrypted. Each group chat also has its own private non-encrypted EOS.
Distribution of clients By design, there is no assumption about the equal distribution
of the clients processed by different XRW groups. As mentioned previously, the
CONNECTOR actor accepts incoming connections and adds information about them inside
the Online list in the form of the client abstraction. Only an idle XMPP actor can pop a client
from this list and thus, a situation when one XMPP actor has more clients inside own PLC
then other is possible. This disproportion does not play a role from the performance
point of view, because the equal distribution of clients does not mean equal distribution
of network load. However, from the security point of view, this disproportion can be
considered as a vulnerability, and as a consequence, each XMPP actor had a pre-defined
limit19 of processing connections.
Operation
At the beginning, only the CAC group works actively. The CONNECTOR actor
periodically requests the ACCEPTOR actor to accept incoming connections. On success, the
CONNECTOR actor prepares a new record for the Online list. The XRW groups are working
at the same time, but all actors stay in the idle state since no one of them has clients in
PLCs. Periodically, the XMPP actors try to dequeue a connection from the Online list and
on success, the XMPP actor changes its state to active and adds this task to its PLC.
In the active state, all XMPP actors perform the same activities. Each XMPP actor,
firstly, goes over all its client abstractions, which are located inside the PLC. From each
abstraction, the actor retrieves the connection socket descriptor, and pointers to the mbox
and to the pool belonging to this abstraction. Then, the actor combines this data into a
batched request and sends it to its READER actor.
A READER actor receives a request from own XMPP actor, comes across the list of
triplets (socket, pool, mbox) and performs the non-blocking read system call on each
socket. If a socket has an incoming message, it will be read into a node dequeued from
the pool and then sent to the mbox. In addition, the READER actor generates and sends
back a special bitfield mask. This describes which client abstractions from the read
request received an incoming message.
19The maximum number of clients divided by the number of XMPP actors
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After the receiving of an answer, an XMPP actor checks the bitfield mask from
the answer, and then interacts with each client abstraction which received network
data. The XMPP actor processes client’s incoming data in accordance with the XMPP
specification and the current state of the client. After successful dispatching of incoming
messages, the XMPP actor changes its state, tries to add a new client abstraction into its
PLC, and then prepares a new batched read request again.
Name resolving When an XMPP actor receives a new client abstraction, this abstraction
consists of three elements only: a network socket descriptor, a pool, and a mbox. At
this moment, the actor has no information that the client is attached to the socket. This
information becomes available only after performing the authentication when a client
sends its JID to the server. After that moment, the actor has the full information about
the client. The XMPP actor pushes the binding of JID to socket into an EOS, and other
actors which need to send a message to this JID can retrieve it from the EOS.
Message delivery When an O2O XMPP actor receives a message from a client, it firstly
checks necessary headers in accordance with the XMPP specification. Secondly, it
retrieves the JID of the recipient from the message. Thirdly, it retrieves the recipient’s
TCP/IP socket from the EOS. Then, if the recipient is online and in the proper state
(this information is also stored inside the EOS), the actor asks its WRITER actor to send a
message through the retrieved TCP/IP socket to the recipient.
An O2M XMPP actor behaves slightly differently. Each O2M XMPP actor has a list of
clients, which share the same chat room. When an actor receives a message, it retrieves
the room identifier, and after necessary checks, sends the message to all participants
from the list step-by-step.
Disconnect of a client If a client drops the connection, the XMPP engine detects
this by the reading of an error from the client’s TCP/IP socket. The bitfield mask
returned to a XMPP actor reflects this situation. Later, the XMPP actor purges the state
of the corresponding client inside the EOS and then removes the client abstraction
from its PLC. After that, the dropped client can reconnect to the server again, and this
reconnection will be processed again by the CAC group.
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Client support The burster utility has been developed for evaluation purposes. This
utility was written in C language, used the libstrophe [95] library and provided the
basic functions of an XMPP client: connection to a server, authorisation, sending and
receiving of messages. The utility emulated the behaviour of multiple concurrent clients
by the spawning of multiple threads, each of which implemented an independent
XMPP client.
2.2.4 Evaluation
This section demonstrates evaluation of the microbenchmark and two services
described previously.
For the evaluation, two servers based on Intel Xeon CPU E3-1230v5 (3.40 GHz, 4
cores, 8 hyper-threads) were used. Both of them were equipped with 32 GiB of RAM
and Mellanox MT27520 RoCE RDMA controller (10 GbE, RDMA capabilities were not
used). Both servers had equal software systems, based on Ubuntu 16.04.3 with the Linux
kernel version 4.4.0-109 and the Intel SDK version 1.8 with builtin Intel IPP library. All
modules were built with the ”-O2” optimisation flag.
The framework contains roughly 6200 lines of C code. The part of the framework
embedded in an enclave contains 3278 lines of code and some of the third-party libraries
shipped with the SGX SDK. As a result, for an application such as the XMPP server,
each enclave was limited by 512 KiB of memory.
2.2.4.1 Inter-enclave communication
The pingpong benchmark measures (i) the performance of inter-enclave
communication implemented by different approaches, and (ii) the impact of message
sizes on the performance. For each communication scheme (mbox and ECALLs), and
for each message size (from 16 B to 512 KiB), the time of 1.000.000 ping-pong message
exchanges was measured. These measurements were repeated five times for each
configuration and then, after the averaging, the throughput was computed in MiB
per second by dividing the transferred data size by the measured time. All messages
within the same test had the same length and pseudo-random content. The transfer
time included not only the pure data transfer time but also the payload generation time.
Figure 2.23 clearly show that EActors (EA) outperforms the native SGX SDK
(Native). As can be seen, the native SGX SDK reaches its peak throughput near 32 KiB.
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Figure 2.23: Throughput of different communication interfaces
This is explained by the fact that for each OCALL, the SDK allocates a memory space
in which the sent message is copied. However, after reaching the L1 data cache size,
which is 32 KiB in Intel Skylake Core [96], memory copy becomes slow. The minimal
difference between EA and Native is approximately 2.8× obtained for 16 KiB messages.
For the small messages (smaller than 64 bytes), the difference is approximately 16.8×,
while for larger messages (longer than 512 KiB) the difference exceeds 30×.
2.2.4.2 Secure multi-party computation service
The two deployment s of the secure multi-party communication service depicted in
Figure 2.21 were implemented: an EActors-based implementation and a SGX SDK-based
version. For a predefined number of parties and vector dimensions, 10.000 invocations
of the secure sum were generated and the response time was measured. These
measurements were repeated at least three times for each configuration and then,
after the averaging, the throughput was computed.
The measured throughput depends on multiple factors, such as the speed of
encryption/decryption of messages, number of parties, vector length and the duration
for generating random numbers. The last factor is crucial because the first party needs
to refill the Rnd vector on each request.
Performance of the plain protocol
In the first experiment, the plain execution of the protocol was considered.
Figure 2.24a and Figure 2.24b show the performance of the SMC service for short (below
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Figure 2.24: SMC scheme
with the plain protocol
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dynamically computed input vectors
54
100 elements) and long (between 1000 and 10.000 elements) input vectors. The two
”extreme” configurations were used: three and eight20 participating parties. Figure 2.24c
shows the performance impact depending on the number of parties. For this benchmark,
three different vector sizes were used: 1, 1000, and 2000 elements.
Firstly, as can be seen, the throughput of the EActors-based implementation is
higher than the throughput of the SDK-based implementation, especially for short
vectors. Increasing the vector length leads to the degradation of the throughput. The
same applies to increasing the number of parties. However, different implementations
degrade differently with an increasing number of participants. As seen in Figure 2.24a
and Figure 2.24c, for the same length of vectors (1), the difference in the throughput
between three parties (EA/3 versus EC/3) is 3.65×. In the case of eight parties, the
same metric reaches 3.96×.
Secondly, as shown in Figure 2.24b, for long vectors, the difference between the
two implementations is not so severe as with short vectors. For example, the difference
in throughput for three parties and 1000 elements (EC/3, EA/3) is 8%, and it becomes
negligible for vectors longer than ≈2000 elements. However, the number of parties is
still an important factor. For eight parties, the difference in throughput is 22% for 1000
elements, which becomes negligible for vectors longer than ≈4000 elements.
To explain this behaviour, three possible sources of performance degradation were
identified. The first one is transition costs of entering and leaving trusted execution
mode during ECALL/OCALL use. The implementation of the SDK-based SMC scheme
uses ECALLs efficiently, i.e. transition costs do not involve copying of memory, and
thus, the transition costs do not depend on the vector length. However, the number of
parties increases transition costs proportionally.
The second possible source of performance degradation is encryption and
decryption of messages, since the vector size impacts the encryption/decryption
demand linearly. To identify this impact, the pingpong microbenchmark was modified to
use encrypted cargos. The encrypted pingpong application reached the throughput
of 1 GiB/s, which is roughly 35 times higher than the throughput of the EA/3
20The minimum number of parties in the SMC sum and a number of hyper-threads in the CPU
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configuration for 1000 elements (7092 ∗ 1000 ∗ sizeof(uint32 t) ≈ 27 MiB/s), thus
connectors bandwidth is not the limiting factor.
A detailed analysis revealed that the source of the performance degradation is
a slow sgx read rand() SGX SDK function. In accordance with the protocol, the first
party needs to generate a vector of random values before each request. An increase of
the vector length leads to increased usage of the trusted random number generator.
Performance with dynamically computed input vectors
In the previous evaluation, it was assumed that the parties do not perform any
computation beside the bare protocol. In this case, the parties update their internal
secrets after each computation of the secure sum. For this, each party generates a
random vector and adds it with the secret one. Figure 2.25 shows the performance of
the two SMC systems with such an additional workload applied.
As can be seen, this additional computation significantly impacts the performance.
For example, for a vector size of only one, the performance benefit for EActors has
grown to 4× for three parties, and to 4.4× for eight parties (Figure 2.25b). For longer
vectors, the difference grows faster. For example, for 2000 elements (Figure 2.25c), the
difference in throughput grows from 2× (three parties) to 4.1× (eight parties). Moreover,
in contrast to the plain execution of the protocol, experiments with very long vectors also
show a significant difference in throughput. Figure 2.25b demonstrates that for eight
parties and any vector length in the tested range, the EActors-based implementation is
at least 3.88× faster.
This experiment clearly shows that additional computations, which need to be
performed by parties, can be and should be parallelised by eactors. In contrast, if parties
do not need to perform computations between invocations, they can be implemented
directly on top of the SGX SDK.
2.2.4.3 XMPP instant message service
The evaluation of XMPP service compares the performance of the XMPP service
built on top of the framework and the performance of two popular non-enclaved XMPP
servers: JabberD2 and ejabberd. JabberD2 is written in C, has multiprocess design
and consists of several services, each of which implements a unique function, like
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routing of messages between different servers or interaction of clients with the server.
Moreover, the JabberD2 server supports Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) traffic encryption
and group chats by the MU-Conference module. ejabberd is written in Erlang and has
an actor-based execution model and also supports traffic encryption and group chats.
The number of messages processed by a service was used as the performance
characteristic. Despite the comparison to JabberD2, ejabberd and EActor-based XMPP
services, the several aspects of the actor-based system were additionally considered:
1. Performance of a single XMPP actor for both communication schemes: One-to-One
(O2O) and One-to-Many (O2M)
2. Scalability of the service
3. Impact of the number of enclaves and the enclaving on the performance
These aspects were evaluated in various configurations and combinations:
• Tested number of XRW groups: 1–32
• Number of concurrent clients: 20–1000 (O2O), 10–100 (O2M)
• CPU and enclave affinities: 1–32 enclaves, 1–8 hyperthreads
Behaviour of clients
The burster utility, introduced in section 2.2.3.3, was used for the load generation.
This utility enables spawning of multiple clients, each of which represents a full-fledged
client which can connect to a server and exchange messages.
The burster was configured to implement the following sequence of actions. At
the start, the burster connects all clients one-by-one to the server. During this operation,
the burster assigns ping and pong roles to the clients in accordance with the evaluation
scheme. In the case of the O2O evaluation, the first half of clients receive the ping role,
the second half – the pong role. In the case of the O2M evaluation, the first client receives
the ping role, while the remaining get the pong role. After the successful connection and
authorisation of the last client, the burster initialises a timer and releases a global lock,
which enables the active behaviour of all clients.
During the active work, each client with the ping role sends a message to the
server. These messages have the necessary attributes in accordance with the XMPP
specification, encrypted (in the O2M case), and have different bodies for the ping and
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Figure 2.26: Single XMPP actor performance, O2O mode
pong messages21. In the case of the O2O mode, the messages include the JID of a random
pong client, while in the case of the O2M mode, these messages include the name of a
group chat which includes all pong JIDs. A pong client in O2O mode sends an answer
to a ping client. After receiving the answer, the ping client increments a performance
counter and sends a new message. In the case of the O2M mode, the group chat server
sends messages to all pong clients, and then notifies the ping client that all messages
have been delivered. After that, the ping client increments the performance counter and
sends the next message.
After the end of the pre-defined time interval, the burster stops the execution of the
clients and accumulates all performance counters, i.e. number of messages processed
by each ping client.
Single XMPP actor performance
Figure 2.26 and Figure 2.27 show a performance comparison of ejabberd (EJB),
JabberD2 (JBD2) and the framework-based solution (EA). The JBD2 used the default set
of components, such as c2c, s2m, router and others for the O2O communication scheme,
and the additional service named MU-Conference in the O2M case. The EJB also used a
default configuration. The EA framework-based service consisted of the single CAC and
the single XRW groups22.
21The overall size of the messages did not exceed 150 bytes
22As mentioned previously, one CAC and one XRW groups use two enclaves: one for the CONNECTOR
actor in the CAC group, and one for the XMPP actor of the XRW group
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Figure 2.27: Single XMPP actor performance, O2M mode
As can be seen in Figure 2.26, the EA significantly outperforms the EJB and JBD2.
However, all services behave slightly differently. The performance of the EA service
grows rapidly at the beginning, then has a performance ”pike”, falls significantly and
then degrades slightly with the number of clients. The performance of the EJB grows
very slowly until the number of clients does not reach 600, and then slightly degrades.
The performance of the JBD2 service, in turn, has the performance maximum at the
beginning, and then, after the fall near the 150 clients, degrades very slowly with the
number of clients ( 1% over 400 clients). In the ”pike” of the EA (40 clients), the EA service
shows 1.81×more throughput than the JBD2 and 35.1×more throughput than the EJB.
For 600 clients, when the EJB has the maximum performance, the EA outperforms the
JBD2 by 1.67× and the EJB by 2.42×. For the 1000 clients, these differences reach 1.62×
(JBD2) and 3.45× (EJB).
The mechanism of dispatching TCP/IP packets defines the difference in the
behaviours. The network components of the JabberD2 server interact with the client’s
sockets directly and can process the messages immediately when they arrive. Thus,
JabberD2 does not need to read sockets manually. Instead, it can use the select system
call for waiting for incoming messages. The EA service, in turn, cannot do the same.
Firstly, the actors cannot be blocked by the select system call because they can be
attached to workers which provide the execution contexts to other actors. Secondly,
the actors do not store information about the connections nor do they have encryption
keys of the connections since they are stored inside enclaves. As a result, to receive
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incoming messages, the trusted actors periodically send requests to network actors -
that process degrades with the number of clients. As many clients are connected, more
time is needed to prepare requests for network actors. However, this feature can be
compensated by increasing the number of XRW groups.
Figure 2.27 compares the throughput of the same services but in the group chat
mode. In contrast to the O2O scheme, the impact of the request-based networking
is negligible for this number of clients and the JBD2 and the EA services scale in the
same way with an increasing number of clients, while the EJB service shows a constant
throughput. The throughput of the EA is 1.40× higher than the performance of the JBD2
for 10 clients, and more than 100× compared to the EJB. Within the number of clients,
the difference between the JBD2 and the EA decreases down to 16% for 100 clients and
becomes indistinguishable for more than 150 clients.
Scalability of the XMPP service
Several characteristics of the framework-based XMPP service were identified
during the evaluation. Firstly, a single XMPP actor shows the maximum performance
with a single READER actor and a single WRITER actor. Increasing the number of READER
and WRITER actors, as well as increasing the number of XMPP actors attached to a single
pair of READER and WRITER actors does not increase the performance of the group.
Secondly, the framework-based XMPP service scales linearly with a number of
XRW groups. The CPU affinity also does not play a role: the system showed the same
performance for the same number of XRW groups assigned to the first CPU core, or
evenly distributed over all cores. The CPU affinities of the XRW groups becomes
important only when the number of XRW groups per physical CPU core reaches a
special threshold.
Figure 2.28 shows the performance of the single enclave O2O XMPP service with
different configurations of actors: a single XRW group (X1), two XRW groups (X2), and
16 XRW groups (X16). As can be seen, the X2 and the X16 repeat the behaviour of the
X1. They grow rapidly at the beginning, then reach the extremum value, and then start
degrading slightly. The extremum value grows with the number of workers. For a
single XRW group, the extremum is 40 clients, for two XRW groups this value is 50,
while 16 XRW groups show the maximum throughput with 400 clients.
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Figure 2.28: Scalability with different number of eactors, O2O mode
The throughput of two XRW groups in the peak is 2.09× higher than the
performance of a single XRW group for the same number of clients. 16 XRW groups at
the peak demonstrate 8.43× higher performance than 2 XRW groups, and 17× higher
than the performance of a single XRW group.
16 is the maximum value of XRW groups that can be assigned to one physical CPU
core (two hyper-threads) on the evaluating hardware. More than 16 XRW groups do not
increase the performance since the system becomes overloaded. The maximum observed
performance per single CPU core is 62471 requests per second. Additional XRW groups
can be assigned to other CPU cores, and the maximum possible performance of the
evaluating platform can be estimated at ≈250000 requests per second.
Impact of number of enclaves and enclaving
Two additional aspects of enclaves were evaluated: how the number of enclaves
impacts on the performance of a system, and how the enclaving of actors impacts on
the performance. For that, two experiments were performed, both of which were based
on the O2O communication scheme of the framework-based XMPP service.
During the first experiment, the impact of enclaves was estimated. 16 XRW groups
were evenly assigned to several enclaves and the performance of the service with 400
clients was measured. This experiment was repeated several times for the following
number of enclaves: 1 enclave (16 XRW groups inside), 2 enclaves (8 XRW groups per
each) and 16 enclaves (1 XRW group per each). Figure 2.29 shows the averaged results.
As can be seen, there is no difference in the performance for more than one
enclave: both 2 and 16 enclaves show the same performance values. However, there is a
61
1 2 16
0
20
40
60
Number of enclaves
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t
(1
03
re
q
/
s)
Figure 2.29: Impact of number of enclaves
1 2 16
0
20
40
60
Number of XRW groups
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t
(1
03
re
q
/
s)
trusted untrusted
Figure 2.30: Impact of enclaving
difference between one and two enclaves. As described earlier, the XMPP actors need to
exchange data, and in the case of the single enclave service, this data is stored inside a
non-encrypted private EOS. In the case of multiple enclaves, the data is stored in an
encrypted public EOS. The overhead of the encryption can be estimated at 6.2%.
The impact of the enclaving was also evaluated. By the framework’s design, XMPP
actors can be configured to work as trusted or untrusted. Untrusted XMPP actors are
working non-enclaved and cannot use an encrypted EOS and thus, they were compared
with the single-enclave trusted configurations.
During the evaluation, 6 different configurations were compared. For the constant
number of clients (1000), three numbers of XRW groups (1, 2, 16) were compared
for trusted and untrusted executions. Figure 2.30 shows the results. In all tests, the
untrusted executions demonstrated slightly better performance compared to the trusted
executions. However, this difference is insignificantly small and never exceeded 1.0%.
2.2.5 Related works
Frameworks and programming languages which feature the actor model have a
long history [97, 98, 99, 100]. However, there is no related work that has proposed
a framework tailored towards the use of trusted execution. For example, the CAF
framework [82], which evolved from the libcppa [101] project, is an actor-based
programming framework written in C++. It offers a high-performance, lightweight
messaging system and supports heterogeneous actors that can interact with devices
such as GPUs. However, the CAF framework misses any support for trusted execution,
as well as central ideas of EActors like effective enclave-to-enclave communication,
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flexible reconfiguration and more. Java extensions, like Kilim [102] and Akka [83],
as well as languages like Erlang [100] offer an actor-based execution model based on
lightweight threads and fast communication using queues. None of these frameworks
supports trusted execution, and porting such heavyweight runtimes like the JVM or the
Erlang VM to SGX is a challenge in itself.
As previously presented, a couple of works have already identified shortcomings
of the SGX SDK: for example, HotCalls [21] offers hand-crafted spin-locks for SGX
to reduce the synchronisation overhead, and SCONE [25] as well as Eleos [22] aim at
avoiding costly enclave exits. However, none of these works addresses multi-enclave
settings. The same applies to Glamdring [78], which enables automated partitioning of
legacy applications but also does not offer support for multiple enclaves.
More related to the framework is Panoply [57], which offers lightweight
enclave-based micro-containers. Panoply provides an environment for execution of
legacy applications inside enclaves using a tiny shim layer which maps unavailable
inside enclaves OS abstractions to the ECALL interface. The shim layer together with
untrusted software supports the UNIX fork API. For this system call, Panoply creates a
new enclave with the same code as the parent enclave, establishes a communication
channel between these two enclaves, and performs data migration from one enclave to
another. This inter-enclave communication support requires a custom mapping using a
reference monitor and is as costly as using the SGX SDK. Furthermore, Panoply misses
configurability, as offered by the presented EActors framework.
There is a growing number of middleware-like systems which utilise SGX:
VC3 enables map reduce [103], SecureStream provides tailored support for stream
processing [104], and SecureVertex enables secure cloud microservices [105]. To connect
enclaves, these systems use standard communication mechanisms like TCP/IP sockets
(VC3), third party message queues like ZeroMQ (SecureStream) or hand-crafted event
buses (SecureVertex). In essence, none of these projects offer fine-grained and fast
support for multi-enclave programming, since they are designed for multi-server setups.
In line with the secure multi-party computation use case, there is a limited number
of works which specifically focused on the combination of SMC and trusted execution.
Iron [106] provides a practical functional encryption scheme involving several enclaves.
To achieve this, intensive message exchange is required, initiated and managed by
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different components of the Iron platform. Communication between enclaves is
performed using standard ECALLs. Accordingly, Iron could profit from EActors’ fast
inter-enclave communication support.
Another SGX-based protocol for multi-party computation was introduced by
Bahman et al. [107]. This protocol has two phases: a preparation phase and an online
phase. During the preparation phase, parties, represented by SGX enclaves, establish
encrypted communication channels. During the online phase, they evaluate built-in
functions. Overall, their proposed SGX multi-party computation protocol and the SMC
use case implemented in subsection 2.2.3.2 share some similarities. However, the work
of Bahman et al. misses support for fast inter-enclave communication and system
support as provided by EActors.
At a higher level, the EActors framework is inspired by the conception of separation
of mechanisms and policies [108, 109]. Mechanisms in the framework are functions
unavailable inside enclaves and thus provided by system actors. Enclaved actors, in turn,
play a role of policies. This separation contributes to scalability of framework-based
applications. Additionally, the framework supports the ideas of lateral trustworthy
apps [110]. These applications are independent components of a system protected by
SGX enclaves. This protection should increase security and isolation applications, which
echoes with the motivation of Eactors.
2.2.6 Summary
The EActors framework enables multi-enclave programming and interaction at
low cost. This is achieved by an SGX-tailored implementation of the actor model which
prevents costly execution mode transitions, offers uniform communication primitives,
and can be flexibly configured for different deployments. The EActors framework
offers a lean programming interface leading to a framework with a small trusted
computing base of less than 3.3K lines of code plus some additional libraries provided
by SGX SDK. Together, this paves the way for novel privacy preserving multi-party
computing schemes and strengthens the security of privacy critical services such as
XMPP message exchange or SMC services. The evaluations show that multi-enclave
programming previously considered costly comes almost for free, and that off-the-shelf
instant messaging services can be outperformed by 1.11× up to 40×.
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2.3 STANlite: a database engine for secure data
processing at rack-scale level
The previous section introduced a new programming model for SGX enclaves.
This model is based on actors – lightweight entities which communicate via messages.
While the lightweight nature of these entities contributes to the decrease of memory
footprint, neither actor-based nor the other programming models resolve the issue of
the EPC paging (section 2.1.2).
As shown in section 2.1.2.2, physical pages of all enclaves are located inside a
special region of physical memory. This region has a limit and when all enclaves
use more memory than the size of this cache, heavyweight paging takes place.
During this process, the system software encrypts and swaps out pages from the
cache and then swaps in and decrypts the previously evicted pages. This process
significantly impacts the perforce of memory consuming enclaved software, particularly
in-memory databases.
In-memory databases, such as Redis [111], Memcached [112], Apache Ignite [113]
and others, are very popular elements of cloud systems. These databases can process
security-sensitive data and thus should be protected from a cloud provider. One
common approach is to use homomorphic encryption, which is slow and limited in
SQL expressions [114, 115]. Under the protection of the Intel SGX architecture, enclaved
databases can provide the same functionality as a non-enclaved database, but securely.
However, enclaved databases should mitigate the negative impact of EPC paging.
This section addresses the issue of EPC paging in memory consuming applications
such as in-memory databases. It introduces STANlite – an enclaved database for secure
data processing in clouds which features in-enclave software-based paging.
The section is organised as follows. Section 2.3.1 analyses memory management
of in-memory databases and provides the general view of software-based memory
virtualisation. Section 2.3.2 covers architectural details of STANlite, including
the virtual memory engine and the communication layer. Section 2.3.3 describes
implementation details of major components. Section 2.3.4 evaluates STANlite using
various benchmarks. Section 2.3.5 discusses related works, and section 2.3.6 summarises
the section.
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2.3.1 Towards an enclaved database with software-based paging
An in-memory Database (DB), like any other memory consuming application
executing inside an enclave, faces performance degradation after reaching the EPC
capacity. Software-based paging, i.e. the paging when the enclaved software
performs swapping of pages without the involvement of the system software, can
reduce the performance degradation. This is possible because enclaved software
can avoid asynchronous exits, which are necessary for hardware-based page eviction
(section 2.1.2.2). Also, in contrast with the system software, which uses the same
page-eviction policy for all EPC pages, the enclaved software can use a more efficient
policy tailored for a particular application. For this, however, one needs to analyse the
memory usage patterns of a database, develop a Virtual Memory Engine (VME) and
page eviction policies. The first task is considered by this section, while the next section
describes the Virtual Memory Engine (VME), and page eviction policies.
2.3.1.1 Memory management in databases
Before the analysis of the memory usage patterns, one needs to select a database
engine for enclaving. The SQLite database has been chosen for this purpose. In contrast
with many in-memory databases like Redis [111] and Memcached [112] that offer a
simple key-value interface, this database features rich SQL syntax, which is important
for data processing in clouds. At the same time, in contrast with other relational
databases like MariaDB [116] or PostgreSQL [117], this database has a very low footprint,
because it was developed for embedded systems. However, since SQLite is a library
database, it does not have a network layer, and it will need to be developed.
An in-memory SQLite DB uses three kinds of memory with different
characteristics23. Firstly, there is the static memory for the DB’s code and data sections.
This memory is long-lived since it is allocated when the DB starts, and freed when the
DB exits. Secondly, the dynamic memory is used for processing queries. Incoming
queries require memory to store temporary data, and this is allocated dynamically by a
DB. This memory is short-lived since it needs to be allocated and freed for each SQL
request. Thirdly, there is the memory used for storing the content of an in-memory
DB. This memory is dynamically allocated, but in contrast with the request’s memory,
23SQLite version 3.18.2 was used for the analysis
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it is long-lived. A DB frees this memory only when the content is no longer used, for
example when a user drops the corresponding tables, rows, or the whole database.
During the operation, the ratio between these memory types changes. In the
beginning, memory used by the DB’s code and pre-allocated variables is the biggest
because the DB does not process incoming messages and has no content. Later, during
the active operation, the content size grows and the share of the pre-allocated variables
and binaries becomes much less than the DB’s content. For example, a fully functioning
in-memory SQLite DB with a 200 MiB content can use less than 1 MiB of memory
for code/data sections24, and several megabytes of memory as a heap. The dynamic
memory allocated for request processing varies differently in accordance with the
request type. However, for most of the requests, this memory is negligible compared to
the size of content memory.
These three kinds of memory have not only different sizes, but also different access
patterns and connectivity with other components of a DB. For example, a DB may
create linked lists inside dynamically allocated memory to process incoming requests.
Movements of elements of the list may lead to its corruption. Thus, this data has high
connectivity since the correctness of the whole data structure depends on the location
of each element. Eviction of high-connected elements leads to the frequent swapping,
while eviction of low-connected elements does not.
Memory used to store the DB’s content, in turn, is much less connected with the
DB engine. This memory mimics the content of a DB’s file stored on a disk, and access
to this data is performed via read and write operations. The elements stored on the disk
are independent and do not refer to other elements directly.
Any of these kinds of memory can be software virtualised. However, the static
memory has much less size than the EPC border, and thus, there is no reason to virtualise
it. The heap memory used for request processing is short-lived, significant depending
on the request type and DB size, and has high connectivity with the DB parts. Therefore,
this memory can be virtualised, but because of high connectivity, the virtualisation may
not lead to significant performance improvements. Finally, the most appropriate for
virtualisation is the storage memory because elements of this memory are long-lived
and independent.
24https://www.sqlite.org/footprint.html
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Figure 2.31: Architecture of STANlite
2.3.2 Design
Figure 2.31 depicts the general architecture of STANlite – an enclaved database
with software-based paging. As can be seen, the central component of the DB is the SQL
engine, which is located inside an enclave. The SQL engine uses a Communication layer
for interaction with network clients. This layer is split between trusted and untrusted
areas and supports two kinds of communication: ECALL-based TCP/IP and call-free
zero-copy Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA).
The SQL engine does not store the DB data inside its own memory but uses memory
provided by the Virtual Memory Engine (VME). The VME manages memory pages
which contain the DB’s data and securely distributes data between in-enclave memory
(so-called warm store) and untrusted external memory (so-called cold store). The VME
provides different policies which impact the STANlite performance (section 2.3.3.3).
2.3.2.1 Threat model
The threat model of the STANlite DB is similar to most of the SGX-enabled systems.
It is assumed that an attacker may have privileged access to software and hardware
components of a cloud platform [118, 119, 24]. It is also assumed that the STANlite DB
is executed on an SGX-enabled platform. Elements of this, as well as CPU instructions,
operate as defined in manuals. STANlite cannot prevent exploitation of known and
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unknown software and hardware flaws. Side channel attacks (section 2.1.3.2), such
as paging-based [60], cache-based [64, 61] or syntonisation-based [62] attacks, are also
beyond the scope of this project.
2.3.2.2 Communication layer
Enclaved software is not permitted to use system calls (section 2.1.2.1). Instead,
it should use ECALLs and OCALLs or system layers of frameworks like EActors
(section 2.2) or SCONE [25]. However, STANlite uses its own ECALL-free system
layer. This is firstly because the frameworks increase the footprint of enclaved software,
which is undesirable because of the paging, and secondly because these frameworks do
not support a modern zero-copy network technology Remote Direct Memory Access
(RDMA), which is widely used in a cloud infrastructure. This bypasses the kernel
network stack by offloading networking to an RDMA-enabled device. Thus, STANlite
can save processing time used for copying buffers, and increase the throughput when
using RDMA for communication with clients.
Unfortunately, RDMA cannot directly write to enclave memory. However, a
significant amount of time can be saved by just eliminating the additional interaction
with the kernel. Furthermore, because enclaved software can directly access network
packages delivered by RDMA, an untrusted helper does not need to deliver packages
via ECALLs. Instead, it needs to notify the enclaved DB about incoming data, which can
be done in a more effective way than delivery of a package. Subsection 2.3.3 describes
this process in detail.
2.3.2.3 Virtual Memory Engine
The VME enables virtualisation of memory used by the SQL engine. In general,
the VME consists of two components (Figure 2.31). The first component is a cold store,
located outside the enclave. A cold store consists of evicted virtual pages that are stored
in encrypted form. If the SQL engine requires data stored in an evicted page, the VME
retrieves the page from the cold store, decrypts it inside an enclave and delivers the
content of the page into the SQL engine.
The second component of the VME is a warm store. This consists of actively used
pages but can be disabled in accordance with a VME policy. When enabled, the store
is located inside an enclave in plain form, i.e. in contrast to the cold store, accesses to
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pages stored inside it do not require the use of encryption and decryption. The size
of the warm store is defined at compilation time and can be arbitrary, but needs to be
smaller than the size of the EPC minus the heap size and the size of code/data sections
of the database.
2.3.3 Implementation
This section provides details regarding the implementation of STANlite. First, it
starts with a description of an internal structure of SQLite, which is used as a basis for
STANlite. Then it describes the glue layer between the VME and the SQL engine. After
that, the section outlines VMEs and the devised communication layer.
2.3.3.1 SQLite as a core part of STANlite
The embedded database SQLite has a layered design, is configurable and
self-contained. The SQLite has not been modified, although two additional layers,
the communication layer and the VME, were added (Figure 2.32). The communication
layer interacts with the network subsystem and passes incoming queries to (or retrieves
answers from) the SQLite Core. The Core consists of a SQL Compiler and a Virtual
machine [120]. The first component compiles incoming requests into bytecode, which
can be processed by the virtual machine.
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Figure 2.32: Internal components of STANlite
The Core does not store the DB’s data, but instead utilises the Backend. The Backend
implements necessary functions to interact with stored data. It uses B-tree structures to
maintain data, and the Pager, which works as a page cache for actively used pages. The
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lowest layer is the OS interface, which interacts with a file-system or a storage device.
The in-memory form of SQLite also uses the page cache. However, in contrast with a
file-based form, SQLite never drops cached pages. In other words, the in-memory form
of SQLite stores all data inside the Pager.
Two of the lowest layers of SQLite’s abstractions can be used for memory
virtualisation: the Pager and the OS Interface. While these layers have different
functions (the Pager is for caching, the OS Interface is for interaction with files), both of
them can be used to store data. Moreover, it is also important to note that the OS layer
uses a Read/Write access pattern for interaction with storage.
After the in-depth analysis of SQLite, the lowest interface has been chosen for
the VME implementation, since this layer is more isolated, independent and more
flexible than the Pager. The VME itself was implemented as an independent module
and connected to the SQL engine by glue code of the OS interface.
2.3.3.2 Glue code
The SQL engine interacts with the storage layer at segment granularity. The size of
a segment is defined by the SQL engine and should be chosen in accordance with the
storage sector size (or the page size in the case of an in-memory DB). During writing,
the engine prepares a buffer and requests the OS layer to write the content of the buffer
at a specific place on a disk. During reading, the engine prepares a read buffer and
requests the OS layer to fill the buffer with data from storage at a particular offset. Data
sizes in both cases are equal to the segment size.
The OS Interface used for interaction of the SQL engine with the OS layer was used
as glue code to bridge the SQL engine with the VME. The glue code implemented the
necessary API, while the VME implemented the storage function.
2.3.3.3 Virtual memory engine
The Virtual Memory Engine (VME) is implemented in accordance with Read/Write
access patterns used by the OS Interface. The VME can be logically separated into two
parts (Figure 2.33). These parts are located in different areas of a host process address
space. The first part is trusted and located in an enclave. This part is active since
it includes modules which actually perform memory virtualisation. The second is
untrusted and located outside the enclave. This part is passive since it is used only to
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Figure 2.33: Internal structure of a Virtual Memory Engine
store the evicted pages in a memory area called cold store. The trusted part also can have
its own memory region with pages named warm store.
Both warm and cold stores are split into pages of predefined size. The warm store,
if used, consists of non-encrypted pages. The cold store is filled by evicted pages. Sizes
of stores are defined at compilation time by the sector size variable. The sector size
impacts the performance of the SQL engine since it defines how often the SQL engine
will interact with the storage.
The total size of the cold store can be arbitrary and can be changed during the
work. The warm store, in contrast, has a fixed size with an upper limit: the total size of
memory used by the STANlite binary, statically allocated memory and the warm store
should be less than the EPC size (Figure 2.34). In this case, accesses to memory object
allocated by the VME do not cause heavyweight paging.
The trusted part consists of several components: an array of cached pages named
warm store (mentioned previously), a hash table which describes the state of all pages,
and a Least Recently Used (LRU) queue, which describes the current configuration of
the warm store. The queue is a doubly linked list with indexes of pages currently stored
inside the warm store. The head of the queue represents the most recently used page,
while the tail represents the least recently used page.
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Figure 2.34: Software-based paging of STANlite
When the SQL engine writes or reads a page, the VME performs the following
steps. Firstly, the VME checks inside the hash table where the requested page is stored.
If the page is stored inside the warm store, then the VME performs the requested
operation with the stored page and updates the LRU list. Secondly, if the requested
page is located inside the cold store and there is at least one empty slot inside the warm
store, then the VME performs light paging. For that, the engine decrypts the requested
page into an empty slot of the warm store, then updates the hash table and the LRU
list, and performs the requested operation. Thirdly, if the page is located inside the
cold store, but the warm store is full, the VME performs heavy paging. For that, the
engine evicts the rarely used pages from the warm store to the corresponding location
of this page inside the warm store, decrypts the requested page into the empty slot of
the warm store, and updates the LRU list.
To prevent replay attacks [121], before eviction of a page, a VME computes a SHA224
hash sum of the page’s content. Computed hashes are saved inside the hash table, which
describes states of all virtual pages. Later, when the previously evicted page is swapped
in, the hash sum of the decrypted page will be computed and compared with the
previously stored value. STANlite stops its execution and detects an intrusion when the
compared values are different.
A VME can be configured in accordance with the initial design considerations.
The exact configuration is based on different features included or not included into a
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Figure 2.35: Page eviction in --i and --I VMEs
VME. A developer can configure the following features: encryption, caching, and fetching.
When combined, it can enable one of four policies (VME modes), considered below.
Encryption
All VMEs provide integrity protection by the computing of hash sums of evicted
pages. This feature cannot be disabled. However, confidentiality protection is a
configurable feature: a developer can disable it. If enabled, a VME performs encryption
of pages before the eviction. Otherwise, it evicts pages in a plaintext form. Respectively,
on top of this feature, STANlite offers two VME modes: the first one named integrity-only
mode, referred later as --i, and integrity and confidentiality mode, referred later as --I.
Figure 2.35 visualises interaction of --i and --I VMEs with the SQL engine and
the cold store. As can be seen, this operation mode does not use the internal cache, and
all read and write requests of the OS interface are translated directly into encryption and
decryption write and read operations. In this mode, STANlite consumes the smallest
amount of memory compared to other VMEs. This mode can be used in strict memory
environments, or in cases where the caching of data does not increase the performance,
or heap memory for processing of a heavy request needs to be allocated. Subsection 2.3.4
provides examples of these cases.
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Figure 2.36: Caching and eviction of pages in the C-I VME
Caching
The --I VME can be extended by the enabled warm store. This mode is called
C-I. Figure 2.36 visualises interaction of the C-I VME with the SQL engine and the cold
store. As can be seen, this mode uses both the warm store and the cold store.
The figure visualises the heavy paging. As can be seen, the SQL engine first
performs writing into the pre-existing warm store page (C2), which moves it to the top
of the LRU list and then tries to read from page C3, which is located inside the cold
store. To perform this request, the VME takes a page descriptor from the tail of the LRU
list (C0) and then moves this page from the warm store into the cold store. The stored
address is computed from the index of the page (0) and the size of the page (PAGE SIZE).
Then VME updates the record in the hash table belonging to the page C0. After that, the
VME moves the requested page from the cold store into the empty slot of the warm
store, and updates the hash table and the LRU list. After successful swapping of pages,
the VME performs the requested operation with the page stored inside the warm store.
Fetching
The Fetch mechanism was implemented in SQLite to enable the use of
memory-mapped storage devices. The Fetch call of the OS interface, in contrast to
Read/Write calls, requests a memory pointer to a storage’ page, but not the content
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Figure 2.37: Fetching pages in the CFI VME
of the page. To process this request, the OS layer maps a storage page into the virtual
memory of a DB and returns the virtual address. Later, the SQL engine uses this data
directly, i.e. the engine skips the Page cache and some internal buffers. This design
significantly decreases I/O latency.
The OS layer API uses two functions to manage fetched pages. The Fetch call
requests a page, while the Unfetch call informs the OS layer that the fetched page can be
unmapped (and additionally swapped out). If the OS layer cannot fetch a requested
page, it informs the upper layer about this, and the upper layer repeats the request, but
in the form of Read/Write access.
Fetch and Unfetch calls were implemented in the CFI VME, which extends the C-I
VME. Figure 2.37 visualises this VME. As can be seen, the CFI mode is built on top of
the C-I VME, i.e. it utilises the same components of C-I, such as warm store, cold store
and the LRU list in the same way. Additionally, each element of the hash table gets a
”pinned” flag, which defines if the page can be evicted or not.
In this mode, most of the pages stored inside the warm store are ”pinned”. The
LRU list cannot control accesses to these pages because the SQL engine does this
directly without involvement of the OS Interface. However, the VME updates the list
each time when the SQL engine issues Fetch or Read/Write calls. Moreover, after each
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Unfetch call, the ”unfetched” page does not leave the warm store, but the VME puts the
corresponding page descriptor into the tail of the LRU list. Thus, within the next heavy
or light paging, this page will be swapped out.
Figure 2.37 shows the particular situation when all pages located inside the warm
store are ”pinned”, but the SQL engine requests a page which is located inside the cold
store. The pinned pages can be used by the SQL engine and thus, if they are swapped
out, the database can be corrupted, because after that, the SQL engine will use data
from a wrong page. However, STANlite does not stop working in this case because read
and write operations can be still performed, even if the warm store is ”blocked” and
cannot provide a slot for a page.
As can be seen in the figure, all pages [C4, C0, C2, C5] of the warm store are
pinned. The {Fetch, C5} call can be successfully performed because the page [C5] is
located inside the cache. However, the {Fetch, C1} or {Read, C1} requests cannot be
performed because the [C1] page is located inside the cold store, and the warm store
does not have an empty slot. In the case of this Fetch call, the VME informs the SQL
engine that the Fetch request cannot be processed and after that, the SQL engine repeats
the request but in the form of Read or Write access. Then, the VME transforms this
request into direct encryption or decryption operation on the data stored inside the cold
store. In other words, when the cache is overloaded, the CFI VME works in the same
way as the --I engine until the SQL core will not release any page from the warm store
via the Unfetch call.
2.3.3.4 Networking
The communication layer consists of three components. The first is responsible for
data transferring at the client side (Figure 2.38). The STANlite client library is linked
with the source code of a client program and implements data transfer between the
program and a STANlite server. The network library supports RDMA and TCP/IP
-based networking, and the data transfer has the same algorithm in both modes: the
network library receives an SQL request in plain text form from the client, encrypts it
and then transfers it to a STANlite server.
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The second component of the network layer works on the server side. This
component is a network helper which receives encrypted packages from clients and
transfers these into the enclave, or receives a package from the enclave and transfers it
into the network.
The third component is the STANlite network server located inside the enclave.
The server receives an incoming request, decrypts it, processes it inside the SQL engine
and sends a response back.
TCP/IP networking
Figure 2.39 shows the data migration path for the TCP/IP-based network layer. The
data migration path includes several buffers and requires several memcpy operations.
The initial data is presented in a plain text form and located inside a Client Plain text
Request Buffer (CPRB). The client network library encrypts the content of the buffer
and places the encrypted request into a Client Encrypted Request Buffer (CERB). Then
the library sends the content of the CERB via TCP/IP socket. This operation requires
the copying of data using the write system call.
TCP/IP
stack
CERBCPRB
TCP/IP
stack
SERB TERB SPRB
Figure 2.39: TCP/IP-based networking
The network helper on the server side reads an encrypted request from the
TCP/IP socket via the read system call and places data into a Server Encrypted Request
Buffer (SERB), which is located inside the untrusted memory. Then, the encrypted
request needs to be delivered inside an enclave by the use of ECALL. The interface
for communication between untrusted and trusted environments is generated by the
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Intel SGX SDK. The ECALL copies data into the enclave (the internal buffer is named
Trusted Encrypted Request Buffer) and then, the trusted callback decrypts the request
into a Server Plain text Request Buffer (SPRB), and sends the SQL request into the SQL
engine.
If the SQL engine generates an answer, the same operations need to be performed in
reverse order: the response needs to be encrypted, sent via OCALL, and then delivered
via TCP/IP sockets back to the client.
RDMA networking
RDMA communication does not involve the kernel stack in data transfer. Instead,
RDMA-capable network devices transfer data from the virtual memory of a client to
the virtual memory of a server. Figure 2.40 shows the data path for the RDMA-based
communication. As can be seen, the RDMA-based communication uses the same buffers
as the TCP/IP-based networking: the initial request is stored inside CPRB, and then the
library encrypts it into CERB. In accordance with the RDMA specification, this memory
buffer is registered with the RDMA device. The buffer of the same size but at the server
side (SERB) is also registered with the network device. The data transfer between CERB
and SERB is performed over RDMA by the issuing of a system call at the client side.
This call does not copy data, but informs the network device that the data can be taken
from the memory via DMA call and sent.
CERBCPRB SERB SPRBRDMA WRITE WITH IMM
Figure 2.40: RDMA-based networking
The data delivered at the server side is accompanied by a notification25. The
notification not only informs the server about new data but also includes the size of the
data. Then, the RDMA helper does not copy the data via ECALL but uses a spinlock
variable shared between trusted and untrusted areas (Figure 2.41). As mentioned
previously, the enclaved code can access the untrusted memory and thus, two threads
can use the same variable located inside untrusted memory as the synchronisation
25The client sends data with the RDMA WRITE WITH IMM flag
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Figure 2.41: Data copy based on flag polling
primitive. The spinlock variable prevents the corruption of shared data accessed in
parallel by the RDMA helper and the enclave service.
When the enclave service detects that the access to network memory is unlocked,
it decrypts the package into SPRB and then processes the request. The response of the
SQL engine is placed into the same buffer as the request, and the RDMA helper sends
back the answer.
Integrity
For the compatibility of the RDMA and the TCP/IP network layers, the
encryption of network traffic was implemented as an independent library on top of the
communication layer. The library is linked with the client and trusted server source
code and thus, the untrusted helpers do not have access to the requests.
The traffic encryption was implemented on top of the AES-GCM-128 primitives
provided by the Intel IPP library. To send an encrypted request, a sender encrypts the
plain data of the request, generates the HMAC and increments the initialisation vector
IV. Encrypted data is sent together with the HMAC and verified on the server side.
After decryption, the server also increments the IV of this network connection. The
incremented IV protects the connection from replay attacks, while HMAC guarantees
the integrity of messages.
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2.3.3.5 Dynamic reconfiguration
The warm store size is defined at compilation time. As mentioned in section 2.3.1,
it is assumed that STANlite mostly processes queries like SELECT, INSERT or DELETE, i.e.
queries which do not require a lot of heap memory. However, as identified during the
evaluation, there are several requests, such as CREATE INDEX, which require extra heap
memory. The mechanism of dynamic reconfiguration was implemented in STANlite to
prevent heavyweight paging of the heap memory. This mechanism can be activated by
the PRAGMA request and works as follows: STANlite evicts all pages stored inside the
warm store, releases the memory used by the warm store, and then switches the VME
into --I mode. This mode does not use the cache, and all memory used previously by
the warm store becomes available for the heap.
2.3.4 Evaluation
The following question was addressed in this evaluation: How efficient are the VMEs
compared to hardware-based paging? To answer this, three benchmarks were developed.
The first one is named microbenchmark. This benchmark measures the performance
of STANlite with different VMEs. During this benchmark, STANlite executes simple
SQL requests and measures the response time required to process them. This benchmark
shows the impact of a DB’s size on the request performance. Enclaved and non-enclaved
versions of SQLite databases are used as the baseline in this benchmark.
The second is named macrobenchmark. This is based on the speedtest1 [122]
benchmarking suite. Different SQL requests are processed differently by the SQL engine,
and design of a particular VME may have an impact the performance. This benchmark
evaluates the VMEs by different SQL requests, i.e. it measures the performance of
STANlite for requests of different types, and compares the results with enclaved and
non-enclaved versions of SQLite. The benchmark uses all implemented VME modes
(including integrity preserving --i), different payload sizes of requests, and different
sizes (smaller and bigger than the EPC size) of testing DBs.
The third one is a complex TPC-C [123] benchmark which implements an abstract
billing system of an industry service with multiple users. This benchmark evaluates
the VMEs by realistic sequences of SQL requests. Moreover, the benchmark requires
communication layers of both kinds and uses different VMEs.
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2.3.4.1 Platform and configurations
The following hardware was used in the evaluation. Two identical servers based
on Intel Xeon CPU E3-1230 (3.40GHz, 4 cores, 8 hyper-threads), equipped with 32 GiB
of RAM and Mellanox MT27520 RoCE RDMA controller (10 Gib). The same network
cards were used for TCP/IP and the RDMA-based types of communication. Ubuntu
GNU/Linux version 16.04.3 with Linux kernel version 4.4.0 was used as the operating
system. RDMA capabilities were supported by libraries from Mellanox OpenFabrics
Enterprise Distribution version 4.1-1.0.2.0. The Intel SGX SDK version 1.8 was used as
the basis for enclaved software development. Encryption primitives used for traffic and
page encryptions are based on the Intel IPP library included in Intel SGX SDK. All parts
of STANlite, including client code, were compiled with ”-O2” optimisation flag.
Trusted Computing Base
The TCB size of STANlite is extremely low. As with any other enclaved software,
the STANlite TCB includes only software located inside the enclave. This software
includes only necessary libraries provided by Intel SGX SDK, call generation subsystem
and basic functions of memory allocation. It does not have external dependencies.
The TCB also includes encryption primitives from the Intel Integrated Performance
Primitives (IPP) library26, provided by the SDK.
The biggest component of STANlite is the SQL engine, which is based on SQLite
version 3.18.2. The SQLite has roughly 110000 Source Lines of Code (SLOC). Other
trusted components, such as the VME implementation, glue code between the VME,
and the SQL engine, benchmarks and enclaved parts of the communication layer do not
exceed 5000 SLOC together.
Memory layouts configurations
A memory layout configuration is the configuration of different memory-related
objects, such as a heap size, sizes of cold store and warm store, etc. Different benchmarks
have different memory layout configurations. Warm stores of all cached VMEs (C-I,
CFI) is 80 MiB in size for the TPC-C benchmark, and 70 MiB for the speedtest1 benchmark.
Since the non-cached VMEs (--I, --i) do not have warm stores, this size is 0. The size
26https://software.intel.com/en-us/intel-ipp
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of memory used by the STANlite binary inside an enclave is approximately 1 MiB. The
baseline presented by the enclaved and non-enclaved SQLite databases has near the
same size of the binary.
Both enclaved (VNL) and non-enclave (NTV) versions of SQLite are configured
to work in ”in-memory” mode27. The heap size available to these configurations is
limited by 2 GiB. The heap sizes of all VME-based configurations are limited by 300 MiB.
However, only 8 MiB of them are used in the TPC-C benchmark, and the 16 MiB heap
is enough for most of the components of the speedtest1 benchmark. Exceptions are
considered in the following subsections.
Both STANlite and SQLite databases use the same segment and sector sizes – 4096
bytes. This value is a default value of the segment for SQLite, and it was chosen as
optimal after multiple experiments.
2.3.4.2 Microbenchmark
The microbenchmark is based on a simple SQL SELECT request. The goal of this test
is to compare the time of random read accesses for different implementations of VMEs
and different sizes of DBs. The following configurations were compared: STANlite with
three engines (CFI, C-I, --I), enclaved SQLite (VNL), and non-enclaved (native) SQLite
(NTV). The load generator was built-in for all experiments, i.e., there were no ECALLs
issued in the enclaved tests.
For this benchmark, a table with a primary key and a text field was created28. Then,
this table was filled29 by multiple queries with random text inside. The size of the text
of each request was close to 1 KiB, and the content of 4 requests fit exactly into a 4 KiB
memory page. Then, the time necessary to perform 10 random selects30 was measured.
After that, the DB was dropped, and the test was repeated with the bigger number of
inserts. In total, starting from 10000 inserts, with 10000 inserts per step, 51 different
tests were performed. The corresponding size of the testing DBs changed from 1 MiB
up to 512 MiB.
Figure 2.42 presents the results of the benchmark. Firstly, as can be seen, there is
a size of DB, after reaching of which, most of the tested configurations change their
27SQLite uses in-memory mode when the :memory: word is specified as the database name
28CREATE TABLE STEST("ID INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT NOT NULL, BODY CHAR);
29INSERT INTO STEST (BODY) VALUES(’<..>’)
30SELECT * FROM STEST ORDER BY RANDOM() LIMIT 1
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Figure 2.42: Comparison of performance in the microbenchmark
behaviour. This point is close to the EPC border in the case of VNL, and the border of the
warm store in the case of cached VMEs. After that point, as expected, the performance
of VNL drops significantly: before the point, the VNL performance is just 1.8 times smaller
than NTV performance, but after the EPC border, the performance falls 4.5 times more
and reaches 8.9 times in total. The performance of C-I also drops. However, this is not
as significant as VNL. After the reaching of the warm store border, the performance of
C-I reaches 31.5% of the NTV performance. The difference between VNL and C-I is 2.8
times for big DBs. This difference roughly estimates the difference between software
and hardware-software implementations of paging.
Secondly, as can be seen, the behaviour of --I differs from the behaviour of other
testing setups. Because --I does not have the cache, its performance is constant and
does not depend on the DB size. For small DBs, the performance of --I is smaller than
the performance of cached engines because data encryption and decryption require
more time than the copying of memory from the cache into the SQL engine. However,
this difference is not significant. For a database 60 MiB in size, the difference between
C-I and --I is just 11%. This roughly estimates the difference between memory copying
and hardware accelerated encryption/decryption. For big databases, the --I engine
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demonstrated 4.44 times more performance than VNL, and 1.6 times more than C-I.
The following example analyses the sources of the performance difference for --I and
C-I engines.
The C-I engine always uses the warm store. If the used data fits into the
cache, the VME stores this data inside the enclave’s memory and does not use
encryption/decryption. The microbenchmark uses linear access to the stored data,
and thus, after reaching the warm store border, the cache stops working because the
stored data is not re-used. However, the C-I VME continues to use the warm store and
as a result, unnecessary operations are performed. For example, for a read request,
the --I VME performs one single operation (decrypt), while the C-I VME performs
a combination of operations: encrypt a cached page, decrypt one page from the cold
store to the same place, and then perform copying. As a consequence, for this type of
requests, C-I shows the better performance for small DBs (compared to --I), and the
worse performance for big DBs.
Thirdly, as can be seen, CFI shows the best performance for both types of memory
sizes: for small DBs CFI behaves as VNL, but after reaching the warm store size, CFI
works as --I. The reason for this behaviour is hidden inside the mechanism of fetching.
When the SQL engine processes requests, it fetches and ”pins” them inside the cache.
The engine assumes that the data will be reused later and then, fetched pages should
not be evicted. When the number of fetched pages reaches the warm store size, CFI
works as VNL, until an Unfetch call will not be issued by the SQL engine. The same
behaviour can be seen in the figure.
2.3.4.3 Speedtest1 benchmark
The speedtest1 benchmark is one of the tests included in the SQLite project. This
benchmark includes most of the requests which SQLite is capable of processing. The
benchmark creates several tables with different configurations and then sequentially
performs various queries with them, starting from a simple SELECT request and ending
with complex ”subquery in a result set” and four-way JOIN requests. Since the SQL
engine of STANlite is SQLite, the speedtest1 benchmark can be used for comparison of
different VMEs.
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Figure 2.43: Performance of different VMEs, local execution of speedtest1
As previously, two baseline versions of SQLite were also compared: non-modified
NTV and enclaved VNL. The load generation speedtest1 program was compiled together
with SQLite and STANlite. The sizes of segments and sectors were the same as in
the microbenchmark – 4096 bytes. The speedtest1 size variable had a value of 2000.
This affects the sizes of tables and the number of queries performed during tests. The
payload of all requests was default, i.e. randomly generated.
Figure 2.43 shows the results of the speedtest1 benchmark. The diagram includes
the execution time of each benchmark’s test for each evaluating service and a database
size of the corresponding tests. Firstly, as can be seen, all STANlite engines consume less
memory than SQLite. Because of the effective integration of the virtual memory engine
with the SQL engine, STANlite consumes less memory. The difference is constant for all
VMEs and can be estimated at 6.8%.
Secondly, as expected, there are many tests where STANlite outperforms enclaved
SQLite. In some, this difference can be estimated at 1.5–2.0 times, for example in 230
(indexed UPDATEs), 240 (UPDATEs of individual rows), 280 (DELETEs of individual rows),
320 (subquery in a result set), 990 (ANALYZE). Moreover, there is the test 310 (four-ways
JOINs), where the difference exceeds 3.5 times. These benchmarks are characterised
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by the intensive memory use caused by active read/write accesses. In these kinds of
accesses, VMEs work very effectively.
Thirdly, there are several tests (100-145, 160-161 and others) where all STANlite
shows slightly better performance than enclaved SQLite. In these tests, the difference
can be estimated at 10%–30%. Moreover, there are several tests where VNL significantly
outperforms all (or some) of VMEs. These are: 150 (creation of indexes for tables), 290
and 300 (refills with different conditions). They are characterised by the intensive use of
the heap memory to process incoming queries.
As mentioned previously, the heap memory was limited by 16 MiB for the
most of the tests. However, these 3 particular tests required up to 300 MiB of heap
memory. Since STANlite does not virtualise the heap memory by design, these
requests expectably show degradation of the performance, since they cause heavyweight
hardware/software system paging.
Finally, as can be seen, there is a difference in the behaviour of VMEs. As in
the microbenchmark, the --I and the CFI engines show the same results very often,
while the C-I engine usually demonstrates better results compared to --I and CFI.
Deep analyses showed that in 290 (refills) and 980 (integrity check), the warm store
significantly improves the DB performance, while in the case of CFI, this cache is filled
by fetched pages.
The speedtest1 benchmark shows that different types of requests (and their
sequences) can demonstrate different performance results. For the speedtest1 benchmark
with 2000 as the size value, the best performance results were demonstrated by the
C-I VME. The total execution time of this VME was 1.79 times smaller than the total
execution time of the enclaved SQLite.
Small database
As shown previously by the microbenchmark, the VMEs behave differently for
different DB sizes. The DB generated during the speedtest1 benchmark was bigger than
the EPC size. After the execution of the first test (100), which creates the first table, the
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size of DB was more than 100 MiB, which is definitely more than the EPC size. The same
benchmark was also repeated for a smaller size of requests, i.e., for the smaller DBs.
Table 2.1: Speedtest1 total execution time, seconds
DB size NTV VNL --I C-I CFI
51 MiB 6.9 8.6 24.1 13.3 13.4
601 MiB 136.5 545 373.3 305.2 370.6
Table 2.1 shows the result of the speedtest1 benchmark performed for big and small
databases. The maximum memory consumed by the small DB was 51 MiB, which is less
than the size of the warm store and the EPC. The big DB, as mentioned previously, is
bigger than the EPC size after the end of the first test.
As can be seen, as in the microbenchmark, the cached VMEs show better
performance than --I. However, the results of STANlite in these tests are much worse
than VNL, and the difference between VNL and --I exceeded 11%. These results were
expected since the goal of the project was a development of a database optimised for
heavy memory use.
Integrity preserving data management
VMEs can evict non-encrypted pages. The impact of encryption was evaluated
by the comparison of C-I and C-i VMEs. Both engines were tested by the speedtest1
benchmark. The configuration of the speedtest1 was identical to the configuration used
in the subsection 2.3.4.3.
As expected, the performance of the preserving integrity-only VME was
significantly bigger than the performance of the C-I VME. The benchmark’s execution
time for the C-I engine was 1.23 times more than the execution time for the C-i engine.
2.3.4.4 TPC-C benchmark
The specification [123] of the TPC benchmark C (TPC-C) describes only an abstract
structure and business logic of the benchmark. The queries themself, as well as a DB
schema, are not included in the specification because different databases have different
APIs and query types. As a consequence, there are many different implementations of
the TPC-C benchmark for different databases. For reproducibility of results, the TPC-C
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Figure 2.44: Comparison of performance in TPC-C
benchmark was not implemented from scratch. Instead, the STANlite benchmark used
queries generated by the existing implementation of the TPC-C for Python31.
The queries were generated for the different number of warehouses – an important
characteristic of the benchmark which impacts the database size. Each warehouse
increases the DB size by approximately 110 MiB. In sum, 19 experiments were generated:
each experiment for each number of warehouses in the range of [1:19]. Then, these
requests were processed by a testing system, and a number of Transactions per Second
(TpS) was used as the performance metric.
Figure 2.44 shows results of the benchmark. It includes two baseline SQLite DBs
(VNL, NTV) and three VMEs (--I,C-I, CFI). Two communication layers were also used:
TCP/IP and RDMA.
As can be seen, the general pattern of the TPC-C benchmarks repeats the previous
experiments. The performance of enclaved SQLite (VNL) degrades over the number of
warehouses, but outperforms all other configurations at the beginning. The --I engine,
as earlier, shows the constant performance for any size of the DB. The CFI engine
repeats the behaviour of the --I engine for big databases, and slightly outperforms
31https://github.com/apavlo/py-tpcc
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the --I engine at the beginning. The C-I mode demonstrates the best performance of
Virtual Memory Engine (VME) at the beginning because of the effective cache, but later,
its performance degrades, until the DB size does not reach approximately 700 MiB in
size, when the performance impact of the warm store becomes negative.
Additionally, the diagram clearly shows the positive impact of the RDMA. For
small databases zero-copy RDMA-based networking demonstrates near the same
performance of enclaved and non-enclaved SQLite databases. Enclaved STANlite
with the RDMA communication layer always outperforms the non-enclaved SQLite
with the TCP/IP communication layer. In sum, STANlite with the --I engine and
RDMA networking slower non-enclaved NTV at just 14.8%, while the difference between
TCP/IP-based VNL and RDMA-based CFI is 2.12 times for 1 GiB DB in size, and 2.42
times for 2 GiB DB in size.
2.3.5 Related works
Pre-SGX trusted execution: MrCrypt [115] uses homomorphic encryption and
processes queries in an encrypted form. CryptDB [114] also provides query-based
homomorphic encryption and operates as a proxy that encrypts sensitive information
at the request level. Working on encrypted data either reduces query expressiveness
or substantially impacts performance. TrustedDB [124] demonstrated that a dedicated
secure co-processorthat processes requests securely and independently from an
untrusted host platform can overcome these issues. However, the secure co-processor
used by TrustedDB enabled execution of only a lightweight database, which resulted
in the hybrid architecture based on two databases: a lightweight trusted one and a
full-fledged untrusted one. Cipherbase [125] also used a secure co-processor, but instead
of a trusted database, it used the co-processor to simulate homomorphic encryption
on top of non-homomorphic encryption schemes. STANlite has similar goals to these
projects, but only relies on commodity hardware and secures processed data and code.
RDMA-based services: Pilaf [126], MICA [127] and HERD [128] are key-value stores
which utilise RDMA. While these projects provide high-performance storage, they
do not have any mechanisms for data protection, either during data transfer or while
performing data processing. Contrarily, STANlite combines the use of RDMA with
trusted execution.
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SGX-based projects: Orenbach et al. introduced Eleos – the software-based paging
technique for programs written in C++. A key abstraction of their design is spointer – a
specific instance of a smart pointer which can determine if referenced data is inside or
outside the EPC. STANlite shares the general direction with Eleos since both projects
are aimed at software-based paging. However, STANlite focuses on custom paging
support for a complex in-memory database and enables fast remote interaction using
RDMA in combination with the use of SGX.
Several related projects offer execution of databases inside SGX enclaves. Microsoft
SQL Server 2014 was enclaved by Haven [26] – a framework which enables shielding
execution of legacy applications. EnclaveDB32 [129], is also an enclaved database, but
with a significant lower TCB, since the compatibility layer of the DB is small. In contrast
with STANlite, none of these projects offer virtual memory support nor fast remote
interconnection.
Panoply [57], Graphene-SGX [27] and SCONE [25] provide a general purpose
trusted execution environment for legacy programs. For example, SCONE has been
used for execution of enclaved Memcached. These frameworks can host an in-memory
database such as STANlite, but none of them offers scalable, enclave-based paging
support.
2.3.6 Summary
Enclaved memory-heavy applications, such as in-memory databases, face the
problem of EPC paging when consuming more than approximately 92 MiB of memory.
During this process, the system software performs page swapping, which leads to
significant performance degradation. STANlite, presented in this section, demonstrated
that an in-enclave software-based Virtual Memory Engine (VME), integrated into a
DB, can resolve this issue since it performs page swapping without the involvement
of the system software. It uses a custom VME and the ECALL-free RDMA-based
communication layer. Working together, these components avoid heavyweight
transitions and enable processing of large volumes of data with comparatively minimal
overhead.
32This paper was published later than the STANlite project
91
92
3. Non-volatile memory and persistent
systems
The memory hierarchy is a core concept of computer architecture. It arranges all
storage devices in the architecture by the access time and capacity [130]. These storage
devices are based on different technologies and, as a consequence, have different
characteristics and features.
The top layer of this hierarchy is represented by CPU caches. The caches are the
fastest memory in a system, but small (tens of megabytes) and very expensive. Moreover,
CPU caches are content-addressable memory, and thus, cannot be addressed directly [131].
The second layer of the memory hierarchy is the main memory, which is represented
currently by Dynamic RAM (DRAM). This type of memory is byte-addressable, volatile
and high-performance. DRAM is much cheaper than CPU caches and much more
capacious [132]. Modern servers can be equipped with tens of gigabytes of memory.
Finally, the lowest layer of the hierarchy is secondary storage, usually represented by
Hard Disk Drive (HDD) or Solid-State Drive (SSD)/flashes. This type of memory is
much slower than DRAM, but significantly cheaper and capacious: secondary storage
devices may store terabytes of data. They are block-addressable and persistent, i.e. do not
require an external source of power to retain stored data.
Operating Systems (OSes) and programs rely on this hierarchy. Programs are
passive entities stored inside non-volatile storage devices. However, they can be
executed after they have been located into the volatile main memory. The life cycle
of a program includes necessary steps to allocate memory for executables, prepare an
execution context, deploy binaries in memory, and more. Executing programs produce
volatile objects which can become persistent by saving into secondary storage.
The life cycles of hardware and software are also developed in accordance with the
volatility of the main memory. For example, after a power reset, all devices, including
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CPUs, start from default states. Then, the primary bootloader reads components of
an OS from secondary storage into memory. Because of the volatility, an operating
system can initialise devices and start programs, even if the previous execution has
been accidentally ended by a crash or a power failure.
Technologies of non-volatile memory can change the memory hierarchy and the
whole computer architecture. For example, with persistent primary storage, there is
no need for data migration between secondary and primary storage devices. As a side
effect, the system cannot be easily restarted in the same way as a volatile system, since
programs are persistent and they need to be transformed to a some initial state [31].
Currently, there is no ”de-facto” standard for the architecture of persistent software
systems. Moreover, there is no single technology of persistent memory. Instead, there is
a group of different candidate technologies, each of which has its own characteristics like
read/write latencies and endurance. These characteristics may vary from characteristics
of DRAM, thereby affecting system architecture. As a consequence, there are several
competing models of persistence, i.e. conceptions which components of a system need
to be persistent and how they need to be integrated in a system, based on different
assumptions and Non-Volatile RAM (NV-RAM) technologies.
This chapter is devoted to the NV-RAM technologies and architectures of persistent
systems. Section 3.1 provides an overview of candidate technologies of persistent
memory and existing architectures of persistent systems. Section 3.2 describes
a conception of hypervisor-based persistence and NV-Hypervisor – a new model of
persistence and a persistent hypervisor for legacy and proprietary software.
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3.1 Background
3.1.1 Candidate technologies of persistent memory
There are several candidate technologies of persistent memory. They are based on
different physical phenomenons and have different characteristics. However, despite
the differences, they have two common features: they can be used as a basis for
byte-addressable memory modules, i.e. modules which support accessing to individual
bytes, and persistence, i.e. they can retain stored data without an external source of
power. In other words, these technologies can be used to create main memory modules
which do not require constant powering.
This subsection provides an overview of the most prospective memory
technologies such as Battery-backed RAM (BBRAM), Phase-Change RAM
(PC-RAM) [133], Ferroelectric RAM (FeRAM) [134] and Magnetoresistive
RAM (MRAM) [135].
3.1.1.1 Battery-backed RAM
Technologies of Battery-backed RAM (BBRAM) have been developing since the
middle of the 1990s. A typical BBRAM module includes two components: an ordinary
memory module and an independent power supply. A simple battery or a complex
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) can be used as the power supply. In case of a
power failure, these batteries power the memory module for a short period of time,
during which the content of the memory should be mirrored to persistent storage or
main power should be recovered. Early persistent platforms like Apple Newton [39]
and Rio [136] used BBRAM in their bases (section 3.1.2.2).
In the recent decades, this approach has been evolved and applied to main memory.
Market available Non-Volatile Dual In-line Memory Module (NVDIMM), provided
by AgigA Tech [137] and Viking Technology [138], use supercapacitors as a source
of temporary power, and have new components: NAND flash and a Power Outage
Detector (POD) [139]. The POD can detect a power outage in the early stages and, by
the use of residual energy of a platform and the supercapacitor, can mirror the DRAM
data to the NAND flash (Figure 3.1). Later, after the recovery of power, the system can
recover the previous memory state from the flash.
95
SDRAM MUX
NVDIMM
controller
NAND
Battery
Power Supply
Host
DDR interface
NVDIMMmodule
Figure 3.1: block diagram of Non-Volatile Dual In-line Memory Module
In contrast to other candidate technologies of persistent memory, BBRAM have
the same read/write latencies and capacity as ordinary DRAM, since the BBRAM is
based on DRAM modules. This makes BBRAM ideal for prototyping of NV-RAM-based
platforms (section 3.2.1.1).
3.1.1.2 Phase-Change RAM
Phase-change memory is memory technology based on the physical properties of
chalcogenides. The chalcogenides are a family of chemical compounds based on metals
and chalcogens – chemical elements in the 16th group of the periodic table, like selenium
and tellurium. Some chalcogenides have a unique feature: their different aggregate
states are characterised by different resistances. For example, a chalcogenide Ge2Sb2Te5
(GST) has two aggregate states: a low-resistance crystalline state and a high-resistance
amorphous state. This difference in resistances is used to encode a logical 1 and 0.
Figure 3.2a depicts the structure of a PC-RAM cell. As can be seen, the cell includes
a silicon insulator SiO2, a chalcogenide GST, and a heating element TiN [140]. These
components are located between two electrodes attached to a transistor. Combined
together, the cell and the transistor work together as a 1R-1T logical element.
The switching between aggregate states and, as a consequence, between high and
low resistive states, is performed by the heating. Figure 3.2b visualises this process. The
heating above the melting point destroys the crystalline structure of a GST, which then
enters into the amorphous state after cooling (red line). To switch it into a crystalline
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Figure 3.2: Phase-Change RAM
form, the amorphous GST needs to be heated to a temperature which is in between the
crystallisation and the melting points (blue line). At this point, the GST enters into the
crystalline form, which is preserved after cooling.
Switching between states requires significant time, much more than the changing
charges in DRAM cells. Moreover, because of the regular heating and cooling,
components of PC-RAM cells degrade over time. In consequence, the endurance of
PC-RAM is lower than the endurance of DRAM [33].
3.1.1.3 Ferroelectric RAM
Ferroelectric memory [134] is memory technology based on ferroelectricity – a
property of some materials to have a spontaneous electric polarisation which can be
reoriented by the applying of an external electric field [141]. When an electric field
is applied, atoms inside a ferroelectric material shift to certain positions inside the
crystal structure. These shifts change the electric polarisation of the material. Without
the external electric field, these atoms keep the selected positions, and the material
preserves its own polarity. Logical 0 and 1 are encoded by opposite orientations of the
polarisation vector, which is defined by the polarity of charges and applied electric
fields (Figure 3.3b).
A FeRAM cell has the similar 1T-1C structure as a DRAM cell (Figure 3.3a).
However, instead of the dielectric used in DRAM conductors, the FeRAM cells use
the ferroelectric material. During the write operation, atoms inside the material become
organised by the polarity of the applied electric field. To read, a special regulating
transistor tries to detect the current polarisation by applying an electric impulse to the
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FeRAM cell. Different polarisations of atoms react differently to this voltage. If the
cell has a 0 polarisation, it does not react. However, if the cell has a 1 polarisation, it
responds by a measurable electrical impulse.
Endurance of FeRAM is high and comparable with DRAM. However, write
operations are slow since they require changing of atom polarisation. Moreover, read
operations are destructive and require the use of a regeneration mechanism to recover
stored inside cells data.
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Figure 3.3: Ferroelectric RAM
3.1.1.4 Magnetoresistive RAM
Magnetoresistive memory is memory technology based on a phenomenon of tunnel
magnetoresistance – a quantum mechanical phenomenon which occurs in a Magnetic
Tunnel Junction (MTJ). An MTJ consists of three layers: top, medium and bottom
(Figure 3.4b). The top and bottom layers are made from ferroelectrics, while the medium
layer is a thin insulator [142]. One of the ferroelectric layers has a fixed magnetisation,
while the magnetisation of the other layer can be changed externally. Parallel and
antiparallel magnetisations of layers have explicit differences in resistance of the MTJ,
and these are used to encode logical 1 and 0.
A reading process in MRAM cells is based on a measurement of the magnetic
resistance of the cell. A writing process is based on changing of the magnetisation of
one of the layers by the application of an induced magnetic field (Figure 3.4a).
MRAM technologies develop rapidly, and the approach based on MTJ has
evolved into other technologies, such as Spin Transfer Torque Magnetoresistive RAM
98
Source line
Word line
Bit line
MTJ
(a) Logical element
Pinned Layer
Barrier
Free Layer
Logical 0
Free Layer
Logical 1
Barrier
Pinned Layer
(b) Encoding of bits
Figure 3.4: Magnetoresistive RAM
(STT-MRAM) [142] and Thermally Assisted Switching MRAM (TAS-MRAM) [143].
A family of MRAM-related technologies is considered as the most likely for DRAM
replacement, since the most of them are characterised by low read and write latencies,
high density, and high endurance.
3.1.1.5 Comparison
Table 3.1 summarises the main characteristics of the candidate technologies and
compares them with characteristics of conventional DRAM and NAND flash.
Table 3.1: Major characteristics of recent non-volatile memory technologies [1, 2]
Characteristic PC-RAM FeRAM MRAM DRAM NAND Flash
non-volatile yes yes yes no yes
Endurance 108 1012 1012 1015 103
Write Latency ≈75ns 100ns 10ns–20ns 10ns 10µs
Read Latency 20ns 70ns 10ns 10ns 25µs
Cell factor (F2) 1–4 15–20 6–12 6–10 4
As can be seen, NV-RAM technologies have several differences compared to
DRAM. Firstly, all of them have less endurance than DRAM. Endurance of FeRAM
and MRAM is lower by three orders of magnitude, while endurance of PC-RAM is
lower by seven orders of magnitude compared to DRAM. Secondly, DRAM has low
and symmetric read/write latencies. However, the NV-RAM technologies have bigger
values of latencies, and more importantly, all of them have asymmetry in read/write
latencies. The most promising technology MRAM has similar read latency to DRAM,but
write latency is still bigger [2]. Thirdly, the cell factor, which estimates the size of a cell
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independently from the semiconductor manufacturing processes way, shows that only
PC-RAM have more significant density than DRAM. Cell factors of other NV-RAM
technologies are comparable (MRAM), or bigger (FeRAM) than the cell factor of DRAM.
Taking experimental technologies into account [144], one can estimate the realistic sizes
of NV-RAM-based modules as comparable than those of modern SSD storage devices33.
3.1.2 Related works: persistent systems
Different related works consider the architectures of persistent systems. One can
separate these works into two groups. The first group of related works is devoted to the
integration of NV-RAM into system architecture on a hardware level. The second group
deals with the software aspects of persistent systems. Below, each will be considered
independently.
3.1.2.1 Memory controllers
Hybrid architectures, i.e. architectures where both types of memory are used, is
the central research area of this group of works. Figure 3.5 visualises two possible
designs of hybrid architectures. The first figure (3.5a) depicts a generalised design
introduced [145, 146] by Qureshi et al. In this scheme, DRAM and NV-RAM are used
sequentially. Since low endurance and high read/write latencies characterise most
NV-RAM technologies, a small DRAM cache attached to NV-RAM can mitigate these
issues. The original work demonstrated that a small buffer (just 3% of NV-RAM’s size)
could bridge the latency gap between DRAM and NV-RAM.
NV
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Figure 3.5: Possible approaches for NV-RAM integration
33For example, Intel announced 3D XPoint memory modules 512 GiB in size [29]
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The second figure (3.5b) depicts a generalised design of hybrid systems [147]
where both types of memory share the same memory controller. In this scheme, the
memory controller plays a crucial role and becomes a very complex part of the hardware
since it supports memory technologies of different types. For example, NV-RAM
requires additional wear levelling, while DRAM does not. The system software should
also distinguish between the different types of memory in its policies. As shown by
FIRM [148] and NVM Duet [149], to effectively use NV-RAM, the system software
should use different memory scheduling schemes for different types of memory.
On the one hand, this integration increases the complexity of hardware and
software, but on the other, it enables the development of hybrid persistent systems
which include volatile and non-volatile elements. In such systems, the system software
can independently allocate volatile and non-volatile objects, thereby making part of the
software persistent or not. The subsection 3.1.2.2 analyses such systems.
Approaches of wear levelling
As shown previously, NV-RAM technologies are characterised by low endurance.
Thus, platforms with persistent memory may include mechanisms to increase
dependability. Similarly to Error-correcting code (ECC) memory, NV-RAM could have
built-in into a memory controller mechanisms of error detection and correction.
Schechter et al. demonstrated [150] that the Hamming-based ECC codes used
in DRAM cannot be applied to NV-RAM technologies, in particular, to PC-RAM. In
contrast to DRAM, NV-RAM is much less susceptible to transient faults, which usually
protected by ECC. As a consequence, ECC-enabled persistent memory wears out faster
than the cells it protects. As an alternative, the authors introduced Error-Correcting
Pointers (ECP), error correction approach optimised for persistent memory.
Another approach, named Safer [151], was presented by Seong et al. Safer [151]
is a multi-bit stuck-at fault error recovery scheme which demonstrated better lifetime
improvement compared to ECP. Safer combines two approaches, the dynamic
multi-group partitioning and the data block inversion. The former ensures that the
partitioned groups include no more than one error bit, which can be detected and
recovered by applying the data block inversion scheme. During this process, after an
unsuccessful write operation, Safer performs the inversion write, and in a case of the
second error, it detects a failure.
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While Safer and ECP require custom NV-RAM devices, FREE-p [152], presented
by Yoon et al., could be directly implemented inside the memory controller. This
approach significantly decreased cost per bit for any type of persistent memory, but
involved the OS kernel in the process of wear levelling. However, a letter work made
by Qureshi [153] presented a more efficient and OS-independent approach.
3.1.2.2 Architectures of persistent systems
This group of related works considers future persistent platforms as hybrid
architectures, where NV-RAM and DRAM co-exist as independent types of memory,
or as fully persistent systems where only NV-RAM is used. These related works are
usually devoted to the research questions: which parts of a system should be persistent
and how to organise interaction of persistent software and volatile hardware. The
related publications can be separated in accordance with a model of persistence, i.e. a
generalised conception of how persistent entities are used in a system.
Because system architecture is the primary concern of this thesis, these models will
be considered in detail. One can distinguish four major models of persistence.
Persistent filesystems
Filesystems organise data located in secondary storage. Since persistent memory
can be considered as data storage, in-memory data can be organised in the same way as
files on a hard drive. However, the programming of persistent memory differs from
that of hard drives. As mentioned previously, NV-RAM offers byte-addressable access,
which differs from block-addressable access of hard drives. Moreover, in-memory
files can be directly accessed (so-called Direct Access (DAX) [154]), while storage data
needs to be retrieved via DMA. These and other features of NV-RAM differentiate
significantly classical filesystems from in-memory ones.
In-memory filesystems were pioneered together with technologies of BBRAM. The
eNVy [155] storage system used a combination of volatile byte-addressable memory
and non-volatile block-addressable flash as the main memory device. A battery-backed
RAM module was integrated into the memory controller and worked as a cache. Later,
Newton OS [39], Rio [136], and Conquest [156] used BBRAM in their architectures.
Newton had a unified layer on top of the object-based storage system, which combined
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an optional flash device and main memory. Rio stored the file cache in a battery-backed
memory module. Conquest, in turn, did the same with the filesystem metadata.
BPFS [157] was one of the first filesystems developed for NV-RAM. To ensure
reliability, this filesystem used an improved technique of shadow copying [158]. In
traditional shadow-paging file systems, updates to the file system initiate sequences of
coarse-grained copy-on-write updates of the file system tree. Due to byte-addressability
and the existence of fast, random write operations, in NV-RAM copy-on-write
operations can be performed at finer granularity. As a consequence, BPFS can commit
small changes at any level of the file system tree without updating the whole tree. While
BPFS demonstrated almost twice the performance improvement compared to NTFS in
ramdrive, this filesystem relied on multiple hardware mechanisms to enforce atomicity
and ordering of write operations.
SCMFS [159] was integrated into the OS’s memory management subsystem. Due
to this, persistent files were available as contiguous regions in virtual address spaces of
user processes. As a result, file access to SCMFS had a lightweight and straightforward
interface. Moreover, SCMFS did not require any hardware modifications but relied
on MFENCE and CLFLUSH x86 instructions to ensure atomicity and ordering of write
operations. Additionally, this filesystem did not provide mechanisms for wear levelling.
PMFS [160] is another light-weight filesystem which bypassed the page cache
and exploited the byte-addressability of NV-RAM. This filesystem used journaling to
update small files, and shadow paging for big files. As with previous filesystems, PMFS
required hardware-supported atomic and ordered memory writings.
Aerie [161] was not a real filesystem, but a substrate for the development of
user-space NV-RAM-aware filesystems. Aerie had decentralised architecture, i.e. each
user of a filesystem used its own user-mode library. However, privileged functions,
which performed the mapping of physical pages into virtual address spaces, were
implemented as a kernel driver and shared by all user-mode libraries. Aeries did
not provide mechanisms for wear levelling and relied on MFENCE and CLFLUSH x86
instructions.
NOVA [162] was a log-structured filesystem which combined both types of memory,
DRAM and NV-RAM. By design, NV-RAM was used to store log and file data. DRAM,
in turn, was used to store radix trees, needed to perform search operations. NOVA
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was a DAX filesystem without wear levelling. Additional mechanisms which ensured
durability were added in NOVA-Fortis [163] filesystem, which could detect and correct
media errors.
Language- and library-based persistence
Persistent memory can be integrated into a user-space program as a new type of
memory provided by a special memory allocator. This should manage the available
persistent memory and within it, locate persistent objects.
Mnemosyne [40] enabled persistence for small objects which could be allocated
statically or dynamically. By design, Mnemosyne used volatile memory (DRAM),
persistent memory (NV-RAM), and secondary storage. The latter stores swap files
used for the virtualisation of persistent memory. Three key services were provided by
Mnemosyne: persistent memory regions, persistent primitives and durable memory
transactions. The first service was used to store objects labelled as pstatic. The second
enabled consistent updates, i.e. data modifications without jeopardising correctness in the
presence of failures [40]. The third hid implementation details of persistent primitives by
the compiler-provided transaction semantic.
NV-Heaps [41] used a memory region so-called NV-Heap to store persistent objects.
As with Mnemosyne, NV-Heaps followed the hybrid design of a persistent system where
NV-RAM and DRAM were used at the same time, but does not virtualise persistent
memory, and provides automatic garbage collection and pointer safety. By request, the
OS kernel mapped a chunk of persistent memory into the virtual address space of a
program, and then, a special library provided allocations, locking and more inside the
mapped region. NV-Heaps relied on architectural support developed for BPFS.
Several projects, such as Atlas [164], Makalu [165] and DNV Memory [35], shared
the same persistence model as NV-Heaps and Mnemosyne, but concentrated on
the durability of persistent objects. In Atlas, persistent objects accessed inside a
Failure-Atomic SEction, which is the critical section extended by durability semantic,
were protected from power failures. Makalu introduced an allocator which protected
heap data from faults during the allocation phase and performed recovery of data
together with control of memory leaks during the recovery phase. DNV Memory
protected all persistent objects by reliable transactions based on software transactional
memory.
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Process-based persistence
All objects created inside a persistent process become persistent without the use of
an additional library or allocator. However, the OS kernel needs to emulate persistent
memory, or have NV-RAM in the system architecture.
The OS kernel can emulate persistence via checkpointing. KeyKOS [36], EROS [37]
and Coyotos [38] implemented checkpointing of processes inside the paging subsystem.
Each process, represented as a set of pages, had two versions: the current version,
pages of which were distributed between the main memory and a swap file, and the
checkpoint version, pages of which were stored on a disk. After a restart, the OS kernel
booted from scratch, but then the recovery service retrieved previous processes from
their checkpoints.
Grasshopper [166] introduced and implemented the conception of orthogonal
persistence [167]. In contrast with the checkpoint-based persistence, where the system
periodically makes a snapshot of processes and stores them on a disk, there is no disk
as an independent entity in this model. All processes in Grasshopper had a unified,
persistent memory layer which hid separation between primary and secondary storage.
NV-process [42] used a process as an abstraction for NV-RAM programming.
Non-volatile memory was integrated as a new memory zone (like DMA) with its own
allocator. Processes, allocated inside this memory zone, were decoupled from the whole
operating system due to the use of independent mappings of virtual and physical pages.
To achieve state-consistent execution, NV-processes used transactional execution mode.
System-wide persistence
The conception of process-based persistence can be generalised to the whole system.
In this case, kernel components like device drivers additionally become persistent.
Whole-system persistence (WSP) [43] was introduced by Narayanan et al. In
this project, all parts of a system were located inside NV-RAM. Volatile data of
CPUs, such as caches and registers set, were protected against loss by the flush-on-fail
mechanism. This mechanism required a POD and initiated a sequence of data flushes in
a moment of power failure. Other types of failure, such as crashes of software caused by
software errors, and system restarts are processed in an ordinary way since the system
architecture includes conventional secondary storage and does not change the life cycle
of programs.
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In contrast with process-based persistence, system-wide persistence needs to take
into account states of devices and persistent drivers. After the recovery of a persistent
system, volatile devices need to be re-initialised and re-configured, i.e. turned into the
coherent with persistent drivers states [31]. For example, at boot, a network driver
uploads a new MAC address into a device, but after a power failure, this value will
be lost and needed to be uploaded again. WSP uses the suspend/resume interface
of drivers for this purpose, which in the end, transforms all power outages into
”suspend/resume” events [43]. This process requires a significant amount of residual
energy provided by the corresponding hardware, because saving and restoring device
state takes much longer than the flushing of CPU caches.
3.1.3 Conclusion
As can be seen, there are many different approaches for integration of persistent
memory into conventional systems. From the hardware point of view, persistent
systems can be homogenous, i.e. only include NV-RAM, or heterogeneous (hybrid), i.e.
combine both NV-RAM and DRAM. From the software point of view, NV-RAM can be
introduced at different abstraction layers: a variable, a process, an operating system, a
file. Table 3.2 summarises these models of persistence.
Table 3.2: Comparison of NV-RAM integration abstractions
Type of Persistence Memory Connection NV-RAM Abstraction Modification
Language/library Hybrid, Parallel Variables and objects Kernel, programs
Process Hybrid, Parallel Whole programs Kernel
System-wide NV-RAM Programs and kernel Kernel
File systems Hybrid or NV-RAM Files Kernel, drivers
All of these approaches need the support of persistent memory inside the kernel,
and some of them additionally require modification of applications. Even persistent file
systems, which do not provide persistence for execution context and in general can be
implemented as an independent driver, still, need the support of NV-RAM inside the
kernel [160]. In other words, despite the different hardware platforms and abstraction
layers, all these have one common drawback: legacy systems cannot profit from the
introduction of NV-RAM. This drawback is addressed in the following section, which
introduces a model of persistence for legacy and proprietary programs.
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3.2 NV-Hypervisor
Despite the fact that the technologies of persistent memory are in the early
development stages, some of them, for example BBRAM, can be used now. These
technologies are interesting on a practical level because they repeat the behaviour of
future NV-RAMs without the drawbacks like asymmetry in read/write latencies or low
durability (section 3.1.1.5). Moreover, these technologies are market available now and
can be applied to existing systems to solve essential challenges like the prevention of
power outages of cloud infrastructures.
In accordance with studies made by Ponemon institute [168, 169, 14], the most
common failures in data centres are related to power failures. The average cost of a data
centre outage rose from $505,503 in 2011 to $690,204 in 2013, and then up to $740,357
in 2016. These costs include not only direct losses of revenue caused by downtime
of services, but also indirect losses, such as temporary degradation of service quality
followed by the outage [168].
In-memory computing relies on the use of in-memory runtime data, temporary
elements of which are cached in the main memory. An example of such data can be
filesystem caches created by a DB during the work. If the data is not secured in persistent
storage, the DB needs to recover it from a persistent log after a restart. However, even
if the data is secured, after the restarting, the DB needs time to populate its caches to
reach the previous performance.
Multiple techniques were introduced by research communities to mitigate these
issues; logging and checkpointing [170] being the most common ones. These
mechanisms require additional resources, have an impact on performance during
normal operations, and delay recovery [171]. Another common approach is to use
protective technologies which specifically address power outages. UPS can prevent
the loss of runtime data and perform mirroring of memory content to storage during
the power failure. However, these devices are expensive, fragile, and require periodic
maintenance (because of battery degradation). As a result, the devices are the primary
root cause of power outages [168].
Persistent memory can retain in-memory data without an external source of power.
Allocated inside, persistent memory runtime and application data can survive power
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outages and do not require long recovery processes. This can decrease downtime
duration and performance recovery time.
As was shown in section 3.1, technologies of persistent memory have a significant
impact on system architecture. However, for users of cloud services, this integration
should be seamless and transparent. Cloud services rely on code reuse and legacy
software – fundamental software development practices which reduce time-to-market.
Unfortunately, no one of the described models of persistence is entirely suitable
for cloud services (section 3.1.3). For example, persistent filesystems do not
provide persistent execution contexts. Language- and library-based persistence
requires modification of the whole software stack and thus cannot be applied to
proprietary/legacy software. Process-based persistence also requires modification
of the kernel and does not provide persistence for the kernel components, for example
the page cache. This cache consists of storage pages which will be lost in the case of a
power failure. System-wide persistence requires modification of the kernel, but also
relies on a significant amount of residual energy used to save the state of drivers in
a moment of power failure. This requires the use of additional hardware to perform
complex procedures of drivers suspending.
To make persistent memory ”invisible” for users of cloud services, it should
be offered at a system layer which is transparent for the customer’s software. The
virtualisation layer provided by a hypervisor is the best-suited layer for this purpose.
The hypervisor virtualises memory management of Virtual Machines (VMs) and thus
can introduce persistent memory without affecting the guest VMs. Moreover, since the
hypervisor virtualises devices, the system software of VMs should not be modified to
maintain state consistency of devices and drivers. Thus, hypervisor-based persistence,
offered by a NV-RAM-aware hypervisor, can provide transparent persistence for
cloud services.
This section is devoted to NV-Hypervisor: a hypervisor which was built in
accordance with the conception of hypervisor-based persistence. Subsection 3.2.1
describes architecture of NV-Hypervisor. Subsection 3.2.3 discusses implementation
details of NV-Hypervisor. Subsection 3.2.4 evaluates the hypervisor. The following
subsection describes related works while the subsection 3.2.6 summarises the section.
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3.2.1 Design and Architecture
NV-Hypervisor inherits the parallel memory model of hybrid persistent systems
(section 3.1.2.1). In this model, both types of memory technologies are presented in
the system architecture. The OS kernel is located inside DRAM and can independently
access volatile and non-volatile memory. Accordingly, the kernel can allocate volatile or
non-volatile memory for applications.
NV-Hypervisor inherits the flush-on-fail approach to flush transient CPU state to
NV-RAM at the moment of a power failure (section 3.1.2.2). It is impossible without an
early detection of the power failure, and a POD is a hardware component which adds
this functionality. A POD continuously monitors the input voltage and immediately
sends a signal to the system when the voltage drops below a defined threshold. On
detection of a power failure, residual energy, i.e. all the energy accumulated in the
electrical circuits, is used to store the virtual context of VMs into NV-RAM. In the
remainder of this section, this process is referred to as fixation.
NV-Hypervisor relies on Battery-backed RAM. This type of persistent memory
has the same characteristics as DRAM, and as a result, the hypervisor does not use
any approach for wear levelling34. However, NV-Hypervisor virtualises persistent
memory, since the capacity of BBRAM is much less than that of prospective NV-RAM
technologies35.
3.2.1.1 System architecture
Figure 3.6 depicts system architecture of NV-Hypervisor. As can be seen,
NV-Hypervisor has a multilayer structure which includes hardware components,
software components, and inter-layer communication mechanisms.
The hardware platform of NV-Hypervisor is based on a commodity server platform
with general-purpose CPUs, volatile DRAM as the main memory, and secondary storage.
Additionally, the platform includes two new devices: NV-RAM in the form of BBRAM,
and a Power Outage Detector (POD).
The software components of the system are based on a general-purpose OS. The OS
kernel includes two additional components: a POD driver and a NV-RAM driver. The
former manages interrupts from a POD, while the latter provides support for NV-RAM.
34Alternative to BBRAM can be STT-MRAM, characteristics of which are very close to that of DRAM
35See section 3.1.1.5 and note 33
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Figure 3.6: Architecture of NV-Hypervisor
NV-Hypervisor runs on top of this software stack as an ordinary volatile process.
It manages all ordinary and Persistent Virtual Machines (pVMs). In addition to the
typical components of a hypervisor, NV-Hypervisor also includes a NV-RAM control
module and vpmlib. The hypervisor provides virtualisation of persistent memory
by managing mappings between the virtual and physical addresses of pVMs using
these two components. The third component, named POD notifier, is used in the
fixation process.
In the case of a power outage, all components work together to save the pVMs
reliably. As shown in Figure 3.6, the POD first detects an incoming outage and issues
(À) an interrupt to the POD driver. The driver forwards (Á) it to the POD-Notifier
located in NV-Hypervisor. The POD notifier performs the saving of the pVMs’s virtual
context (Â) and then notifies the POD driver about the end of the fixation process (Ã).
Afterwards, the kernel flushes all caches and stops memory operations.
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3.2.2 Persistent Virtual Machines
The minimum persistent executable unit in NV-Hypervisor is a VM. This can be
represented as a combination of two components. The first component is a RAM image
of the VM. This image is a chunk of host memory which is used for emulation of guest
system RAM. The image includes all runtime data of guest services such as the kernel
and programs. The second component is virtual context (or just context), which includes
states of VM’s virtual CPUs and emulating devices. The devices (and the virtual CPUs)
are parts of the hypervisor, but can be exported or imported.
Hypervisor-based persistence implemented in NV-Hypervisor is memory-centric. It
means that only a RAM image is permanently located inside persistent memory. All
other components do not use persistent memory at all, or only partly. The host system,
its device drivers and NV-Hypervisor itself stay volatile and shall be restarted after
every failure. Each virtual context is located in the volatile memory (since it is part
of the hypervisor), but the hypervisor has a special serialisation mechanism which
saves this data to NV-RAM at the moment of a power failure. This combination of
volatile and non-volatile components keeps the whole software stack and the hardware
platform coherent.
Following this approach, the recovery of a pVM, in essence, is performed in the
same way as the recovery of an ordinary VM from its snapshot. In other words, to
recover a pVM, NV-Hypervisor needs to create an empty context of a VM, attach the
persistent RAM drive to this context, and then apply the previous stored virtual context
to this VM. After this procedure, the pVM will be retrieved and ready to continue
execution on its own.
3.2.3 Implementation
NV-Hypervisor extends the commonly used virtualisation platform QEMU. As
a hardware platform, the prototype of NV-Hypervisor uses the NVDIMMs-based
solution provided by Viking Technology [138]. The NVDIMMs are implemented as
DRAM memory modules which are backed with NAND memory of the same size. The
NVDIMMs have a supercapacitor, which is used as a source of power at the moment of
a power failure to mirror the DRAM state to flash memory.
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3.2.3.1 Core services
The detection of a power failure is implemented by a POD, which comes attached
with the NVDIMMs. Communication between the POD notifier and the POD driver
is implemented by a blocking ioctl-syscall. For that, NV-Hypervisor first spawns a
pthread for a POD notifier and then, the notifier issues a special system call. The POD
driver blocks this call inside the kernel until a power outage is detected.
Two additional QEMU monitor commands were implemented to manage pVMs:
dump-devices and nv-restore. The first command serialises and saves the virtual
context of a pVM, while the second applies the previously saved context to a pVM. Also,
two additional command line arguments were added to QEMU: -nv-restore and -nvm.
The first flag forces QEMU to perform the nv-restore command immediately after the
start, while the second flag forces QEMU to use vpmlib for memory management.
3.2.3.2 Virtual Persistent Memory
NV-Hypervisor uses a vpmlib library for persistent memory management. The
library is implemented in user-space, offloads persistent memory-related policies from
the kernel and performs two functions. Firstly, it provides concurrent primitives for
persistent memory allocation/deallocation. Secondly, it extends available volumes
of persistent memory by the use of the virtualisation layer together with secondary
storage. As a result, multiple instances of NV-Hypervisor, or any other NV-RAM-aware
programs, can allocate and use bigger than available chunks of persistent memory.
The vpmlib library provides a minimalistic API to allocate (nvalloc()) and free
(nvfree()) regions of Virtual Persistent Memory (VPM). Internally, this is implemented
by the system calls mmap and munmap to map pages from the persistent memory (located
in /dev/mem) into the virtual memory of the running process. In between these levels,
vpmlib manages persistent memory, i.e. provides name-based allocation, implements the
swapping mechanism and recovery of previous allocated regions. The latter is possible
due to the allocation inside NV-RAM of all structures which describe configurations of
persistent regions.
Despite the simple API, vpmlib covers many technical aspects of memory
management, which are discussed below.
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Figure 3.7: Simplified example of a virtualised persistent memory region
Concurrency or allocations
Multiple instances of NV-Hypervisor should have the ability to allocate/free
memory regions concurrently. Because each instance has its own version of the policy
library, i.e. vpmlib, all instances should have a mechanism for data access serialisation.
The vpmlib library ensures this through the mechanism of filesystem locks provided by
the Linux kernel.
Page allocation and swapping
Each instance of NV-Hypervisor manages a single chunk of persistent memory.
If the size of a pVM is equal to or less than the size of the chunk, the vpmlib library
does not virtualise persistent memory. Instead, it maps the requested size of its own
NV-RAM chunk to an empty region of the NV-Hypervisor’s virtual address space and
uses this region to store the RAM image of pVM. However, if the requested size of pVM
is bigger than the size of the available memory, the vpmlib library uses the available
persistent memory as a cache for frequently used persistent pages, and stores rarely
used pages in a swap file.
At the beginning, the vpmlib library allocates a swap file and a range of virtual
memory inside NV-Hypervisor’s address space. The size of the range is equal to the
requested size of pVM. Moreover, the sum of the swap file size and the NV-RAM chunk
size is also equal to the requested size of pVM. Pages of the allocated virtual memory do
not have corresponding physical pages, and any access to them causes a SIGSEGV page
fault signal. The vpmlib library registers a signal handler vpm fault handler, zeroes the
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NV-RAM chunk and the swap file, clears Persistent Page Table (PPT), which describes
mappings of pages, and finalises the initialisation process.
The initial state of all components is presented in Figure 3.7a. As can be seen,
a pVM has six pages, but only three of them can be located inside NV-RAM in this
example. After the initialisation, all pages inside the swap file and the NV-RAM are
empty, and there are no mappings between NV-RAM and the virtual memory.
Any access by the virtualisation engine of NV-Hypervisor to any page of the
reserved range causes a page fault, which is processed by the registered page fault
handler vpm fault handler. The page fault handler receives an address of a virtual
page, access to which caused the page fault, and computes the number of the NV-RAM
page which needs to be mapped to this address. Next, the handler maps an empty page
of NV-RAM to the fault address, copies data from the corresponding offset of the swap
file into this page, modifies PPT, and resumes the execution. In the considered example
(Figure 3.7b), the page fault handler detects three access attempts to pages #0, #1 and #2
and maps NV-RAM pages to the corresponding addresses.
However, at some moment, all pages inside NV-RAM become used, and the page
fault handler should perform swapping. During this process, the handler first identifies
the oldest allocated page, moves its data to the swap file, flushes storage caches, and
atomically updates PPT. Then, the handler retrieves content of the requested page from
the swap file, copies it into the previous freed page of NV-RAM, and atomically updates
PPT the second time. Then, the handler changes mappings and resumes the execution.
Figure 3.7c visualises such case. As shown, during the swapping process, page #0 was
moved into the swap, while page #3 occupied the freed place. Pages #1 and #2 use the
same mappings, while pages 0, 4, and 5 are unmapped.
Name-based allocation
During the recovery process, NV-Hypervisor creates an empty VM, attaches a
RAM drive located inside NV-RAM and applies previously saved virtual context. After
that, the VM can continue own execution from the same state which it had before the
fault. If a host system has more than one NV-Hypervisor instance, then it needs to have
a mechanism to distinguish the previously assigned RAM image. This is done by a
name-based allocator, which is provided by the nvalloc() function.
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Figure 3.8: Name-based allocation of two VMs
In contrast to the ordinary malloc function, this function receives two arguments.
One of them is a unique identifier of a memory chunk, the second one is the size of the
requested memory chunk. This identifier is computed as a hash value created from the
pVM’s name and an allocation sequence number36.
Figure 3.8 visualises relationships between the name-based allocator and the virtual
memory engine. As can be seen, NV-RAM has several regions. The first one, named
CONFiguration section (CONF), consists of technical information like a location of
the synchronisation primitive, page sizes and more. The second part is a Table of
Contents (ToC). The ToC is a simple table, elements of which are encoded associations
between identifiers of memory regions with their sizes and offsets. The remaining part
of NV-RAM is occupied by allocated regions or empty blocks.
Each allocated region also has a small header, named Persistent Page Table
(PPT). This header describes mappings of persistent pages of this region as well
as a configuration of the corresponding swap file. Each NV-Hypervisor instance
manages only pages located in the assigned memory region. As a consequence, the
synchronisation primitive is used only for rare moments of allocation and freeing of
regions and does not impact the performance.
36NV-Hypervisor has a single threaded design and thus, sequences of allocations are always the same
inside each hypervisor instance.
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Figure 3.9: States of the virtual memory engine during a page fault
Critical path
The page swapping process is failure-atomic, i.e. memory pages are recoverable
independently at the moment of a power outage. This is possible because of the
independent updates of PPT.
The virtual memory engine have several states, which are depicted in Figure 3.9.
The engine can be in one of four states when a page fault happens: Execution (1), Swap
out (2), Swap in (3), and Execution (4). A page fault transforms the engine from (1) to
(2), while the first update of PPT transforms from (2) to (3). The second update of PPT
transforms the engine to state (4).
States (1) and (4) are safe because there is no data exchange between a swap file
and persistent memory. States (2) and (3) are also safe because these operations will be
restarted after the power outage recovery: thanks to the separated updates of PPT, the
swapping in and out processes are not done until this is not reflected in PPT.
Finally, there are two moments which could be vulnerable to faults: the updates of
PPT. However, these updates are very short (just a few 64-bit values), and the engine
always finalises these operations in the fixation process. Consequently, all operations of
the virtual engine are failure-atomic.
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3.2.4 Evaluation
The following questions were addressed in the evaluation of NV-Hypervisor:
• How fast is the fixation process? E.g. what are the demands in residual energy?
• Does VPM influence runtime performance? E.g. due to swapping of pages.
• Does NV-Hypervisor decrease recovery time?
A server platform from Viking Technology equipped with two six-core Xeon CPUs,
4 GiB of DRAM and 4 GiB of NVDIMMs was used in the evaluation. The host operating
system was based on Fedora 17 with the Linux kernel version 3.4.12. The same version
of Fedora was used as a guest OS inside all VMs. QEMU version 1.4.2 was used as a
virtualisation engine.
3.2.4.1 Time to fixate a pVM
As described earlier, residual energy is used as a source of power for the fixation
process of pVMs. Different power supply units and different implementations of PODs
provide different amounts energy. The precise measurement of time necessary to fixate
a pVM can help formulate the requirements for new power devices.
Table 3.3: Timings of the pVM fixation process
Step Time, ms
À Interrupt delivery n/a
Á NV-Hypervisor notification < 1
Â Fixation < 1
Ã Return to the kernel < 1
Total reaction time < 3
Table 3.3 shows timings of a pVM saving process. As can be seen, each step of the
saving process, i.e. delivery of a signal from a POD driver to NV-Hypervisor, fixation,
returning to the kernel, does not exceed 1 ms each or 3 ms in total. This also was tested
with up to four pVMs without any significant difference in the fixation time. This is not
surprising since for every pVM, only a very small amount of data needs to be copied to
the NV-RAM.
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Two factors play a crucial role in the fixation process. Firstly, the size of CPU caches
defines the volume of data which needs to be fixated. The number of pVMs does not
impact this and this time is constant for any number of virtual machines. Secondly, the
fixation process also includes the serialisation process when NV-Hypervisor exports
states of virtual devices to NV-RAM. This process requires time, but different instances
of NV-Hypervisor can do this in parallel. Since the evaluation platform has four cores,
the fixation time of four pVMs is very close to that of a single pVM.
3.2.4.2 VPM microbenchmark
The Redis Key-Value Store (KVS) was used to evaluate the performance impact
of the VPM implementation. The redis-benchmark tool, which is provided by the Redis
project, was used as a load generator. The generator and testing services were located
on different servers connected by 1 GiB Ethernet.
Firstly, the performances of pVM and volatile VM were compared. For that, two
virtual machines with the same software inside, but different memory types were created
and benchmarked. In both cases, the size of memory available to a VM was limited
by 256 MiB. As expected, both types of VMs demonstrated the same performance over
multiple experiments, since NVDIMMs were based on conventional DRAM modules.
Moreover, the parallel execution of multiple pVMs did not impact the performance.
This was not surprising since VPM can perform mapping and accessing of persistent
pages in parallel. The synchronisation is only required when new regions of persistent
memory need to be allocated, which happens only on pVM startup.
Secondly, the performance of pVMs with different sizes of available physical
regions were compared. The same benchmark was repeated several times, and
the testing pVM had different share between sizes of available physical and virtual
memories each time. The virtual memory size was always constant (256 MiB), while
the size of available NV-RAM decreased in each experiment by 25.6 MiB (10%), starting
from 256 MiB (100%) down to 52.2 MiB (20%).
Figure 3.10 shows results of the benchmarks. The X axis represents Memory
Residence Ratio (MRR) computed as:
MRR =
InMemory
InMemory+ InSwap
∗ 100%
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Figure 3.10: Redis performance degradation for set/get requests as a function of MRR
where InMemory is a size of available NV-RAM, while InMemory+ InSwap is a size
of virtual memory. The Y axis represents the relative performance of a benchmarking
setup, compared to the baseline (100%).
As can be seen, without swapping (MRR=100%), the pVM performs at the same
speed as a usual VM, both for get and set requests. However, by decreasing the MRR,
the performance drops almost linearly for the get requests, while the performance of set
requests stays at 90% until the MRR reaches 60%.
The reason for the difference in behaviour is hidden in the memory access patterns
used in the benchmarks. During the set request benchmark, new memory is allocated
linearly and VPM is not involved until consumed memory reaches InMemory border,
i.e., with a MRR of 90% the system will have to swap-out pages only when the amount
of free memory falls below 10%. In contrast to this, the benchmark for get requests
performs random get requests on a pre-filled database. Therefore, the probability for get
requests to access a swapped out page is very linear to the MRR.
Figure 3.11 supports this hypothesis. The figure visualises a page fault rate for
different benchmarks and different MRR values. As can be seen, in the case of the get
benchmark, for both values of MRRs (40% and 60%), pVMs demonstrate different, but
an almost constant page fault rate. Both set benchmarks, in turn, have nearly the same
page fault rate during the first 100 seconds. An average value of this rate is significantly
lower than that of the get benchmarks. However, both set tests have points when the rate
of page faults starts growing rapidly (and linearly), and the test with the smaller MRR
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Figure 3.11: Number of page faults for different MRR (fixed workload)
(40%) reaches this point early. In other words, the diagram supports the hypothesis
that the get benchmarks constantly experience page faults since they randomly access
memory and hit swapped out pages, while the set benchmarks start experiencing page
faults when the content of an in-memory DB exceeds the InMemory value.
In sum, the benchmarks expectably demonstrated that the virtualisation of
persistent memory linearly impacts the performance of virtual machines, but the exact
impact depends on memory management strategies of a virtual service.
3.2.4.3 Recovery of a cloud service
Recovery behaviour of NV-Hypervisor was evaluated by a pVM with a
memory-heavy service inside. A MySQL database was used as the service, and sysbench
oltp test suite37 was used as a load generator. An evaluation scenario was based on
the simple power failure case: a hardware platform gets a power outage at a random
moment of time, and then, after the recovery of power, it needs to restart services
independently. The evaluation compares the recovery behaviour of an unmodified
vanilla GNU/Linux system running plain QEMU with the NV-Hypervisor prototype.
Table 3.4 details the different phases during the boot process. As shown,
the actual boot process of the host operating system is quite similar. In fact, the
NV-Hypervisor-based system is even slower as the NVDIMMs have to be initialised and
checked at the start. The Viking platform used for evaluation was an early evaluation
37http://sysbench.sourceforge.net/
120
Table 3.4: Boot process comparison
Boot phase Commodity system (sec) NV-Hypervisor (sec)
DB warm up 566 n/a
DB recovery 54 n/a
GuestOS boot 31 n/a
QEMU start 0.2 8
Host boot 108 108
BIOS 15 15
NVDIMMs init n/a 109
Server boot 36 36∑
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Figure 3.12: Process of a DB performance recovery
platform, and future NV-RAM-based platforms will probably not need these steps. After
QEMU/NV-Hypervisor is running, the situation changes as for the commodity system:
the VM and its services have to be started, while in the case of NV-Hypervisor this is
not necessary. Still, up to this point, the NV-Hypervisor-based solution is ≈13% slower.
However, the picture changes dramatically once the actual runtime behaviour of
both implementations is taken into account. A relational database typically has a long
warm-up phase until queries can be answered at full speed. Accordingly, the time until
booth settings were fully operation was measured. For that, the sysbench utility was
used, which creates a table with 1.000.000 lines and measures request response time
for a random query applied to this table. The warm-up phase took 566 seconds for the
commodity system, and zero time for the NV-Hypervisor-based solution.
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Figure 3.12 visualises the warm-up process. At the beginning, both systems
demonstrate similar performance. Then, a power outage takes place, and a recovery
process begins at time zero. While the commodity solution continues operation after
244.2 seconds, the NV-Hypervisor-based requires 31.8 additional seconds. However,
initial queries of the commodity system processed immediately after the recovery
require about a factor of 5 more time, compared to the NV-Hypervisor-based instance.
In sum, the evaluation demonstrated that NV-Hypervisor has a constant time for
any VM recovery, which heavily depends on hardware support of NV-RAM. When
taking the actual service response time into account, the commodity system demands
for a factor of 2.9 longer until the recovery is fully finished.
3.2.5 Related works
In addition to the works described in Section 3.1, there are several other related
works. Rapilog [172], used residual energy to store transaction logs of a database at the
moment of a power failure. NV-Hypervisor uses the same approach in the fixation.
Kannan et al. presented [173] a virtualisation engine for persistent memory.
NV-Hypervisor and this work target the same issue but resolve it differently.
NV-Hypervisor provides virtualisation at the level of the hypervisor, while Kannan et
al. provide the same inside the kernel. While the kernel-based approach can be used
instead of the hypervisor-based one, the latter enables more fine-grained management
of resources, for example, assigning of the VM images as a swap file.
Ex-Tmem [174] also use persistent memory together with virtual machines. Here,
persistent memory was used as a fast caching system for swapped out pages, i.e. instead
of moving swapping out pages to secondary storage, the virtualisation engine moved
them to persistent memory. This approach significantly improves performance during
runtime, but does not provide persistence to virtual machines and does not decrease
the performance recovery time.
Mini-Ckpts [175] introduced a system recovery approach in which programs
located inside persistent memory can tolerate crashes of the OS kernel. This approach
has many similarities with NV-Hypervisor, but NV-Hypervisor and Mini-Ckpts have
different fault models: NV-Hypervisor protects virtual machines from power outages,
while Mini-Ckpts does not. However, Mini-Ckpts can be applied to pVMs.
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Several works addressed the consistency issue of persistent drivers and volatile
devices. Whole-system persistence [43] suspends persistent drivers in a moment
of power failure. This process requires a significant amount of residual energy.
Ohmura et al. proposed [176] another approach: all write operations to device
configuration registers should be logged into persistent memory. During the recovery
phase, the logged operations should be performed again, which turns a reset device
into a pre-failure state. This approach requires significant modification of drivers.
NV-Hypervisor uses a virtualisation layer to decouple volatile devices and persistent
software. It saves only the volatile context, the size of which is much less than that of
the kernel drivers, and requires modification of neither host nor guest drivers.
Continues VM replication, presented by Remus [171], Kemari [177], qemu-mc [178],
is another approach for fast recovery of virtual machines. This approach uses two
servers, one with a replicated VM, the other with a backup VM. The replication system
keeps these virtual machines in a synchronous state, and if the first VM or the first server
crashes, the second VM continues execution. To minimise the performance impact of
the replication system, these servers should be located inside the same data centre, and
thus, in case of a datacenter-wide power outage, both servers will lose their state, which
is not the case with NV-Hypervisor. At the same time, NV-Hypervisor does not protect
virtual machines from crashes, and to prevent this, the hypervisor can be extended by
one of these continuous replication systems.
3.2.6 Summary
Power outages in Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds may cause a loss of data.
Additionally, the performance of the services is often degraded after a system restart.
NV-RAM can retain stored information without an external source of power and, thus,
can secure in-memory data. However, integration of persistent memory requires the
revision of existing architectures. Existing approaches cannot be applied since they
require significant modification of system and user software. NV-Hypervisor, developed
in accordance with the hypervisor-based model of persistence, provides transparent
persistence for legacy and proprietary software. It supports virtualisation of persistent
memory, parallel execution of multiple pVMs and, as was shown during evaluation,
can significantly decrease the performance recovery time of a memory-heavy service.
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4. Conclusion
Scalability and security are the two important challenges which impact further
development and propagation of clouds. Two research areas address these issues.
Persistent systems based on modern NV-RAM technologies can significantly increase
performance of cloud systems. Trusted execution, supported by the modern CPU
extensions like AMD SEV and Intel SGX, enable trusted computations in untrusted
environments. However, the CPU extensions and NV-RAM impact system architecture
and require additional system support. This thesis addresses that through two
research questions:
Q1: What is a better programming model and system support for SGX
enclaves?
In section 2.1 I provided a detailed analysis of Intel SGX and its shortcomings.
I showed that while SGX enclaves protect user-space programs, they do this with
performance penalties because of the high transition costs and the EPC paging.
EActors As the first contribution, I developed the EActors programming framework
for SGX enclaves.
In section 2.2 I demonstrated that existing programming approaches and
frameworks do not fully use the advantages of enclaves: the Intel SDK offers only basic
primitives while frameworks like SCONE, Haven, and Graphene-SGX offer support for
monolithical single enclave applications. In contrast to these, the EActors framework
offers a lean actor programming model, flexible deployment based on multiple enclaves
and high-performance enclave-to-enclave communication primitives. In the evaluation,
I demonstrated how a commodity service built on top of this framework can benefit
from multi-enclave design and outperform even non-enclaved service with the same
functionality.
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STANlite As the second contribution, I developed the low footprint enclaved database
engine STANlite.
In section 2.3, I demonstrated that the existing hardware-based paging mechanism
significantly decreases the performance of memory-consuming applications, in
particular databases. As an alternative I developed a software-based paging mechanism,
which performs the page swapping without involvement of the untrusted system
software, and developed a database engine STANlite on top of it. STANlite has
minimalistic TCB, features the software-based virtual memory engine with various
policies and the high-performance ECALL-free communication layer. In the evaluation,
I demonstrated that the combination of these two approaches allows STANlite to
significantly outperform the enclaved baseline for databases bigger than the EPC size.
Q2: What is a better model of persistence and system support for
persistent memory?
In section 3.1, I presented the overview of prospective persistent memory
technologies and an analysis of their features and limitations. I demonstrated that
candidate technologies, such as PC-RAM, FeRAM and STT-MRAM, can be considered
as a replacement for DRAM. I also provided the overview of existing research
projects and described how persistent memory can be integrated and supported by
system software.
NV-Hypervisor As the third contribution, I developed a new model of persistence,
named hypervisor-based model of persistence and the corresponding system support in
the form of the NV-RAM-aware hypervisor.
In section 3.2, I demonstrated that legacy systems cannot profit from the
introduction of NV-RAM because of limitations of existing models of persistence and
a lack of necessary system support. NV-Hypervisor uses a name-based allocator
with virtual memory support to provide transparent persistence for legacy and
proprietary programs at the level of virtual machines. The evaluation of the hypervisor
demonstrated that it can significantly decrease the performance recovery time of
memory-consuming services.
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4.1 Future work: Toward encrypted persistent systems
Persistence of main memory makes its content vulnerable to attacks based on
physical access. In volatile systems, to perform a cold-boot attack, an attacker needs
to make additional manipulations with memory modules: significantly decrease the
temperature of the modules, remove them from the attacked hardware and place them
into the attacker’s platform. After that, the attacker can extract data. NV-RAM modules,
in turn, do not require low temperatures to retain stored data in the absence of an
external source of power, and thus, the content of those modules can be easily extracted.
To prevent such attacks, persistent systems require memory encryption to protect the
data stored inside, similarly as memory encryption protects volatile data [179]. This
leads to the development of encrypted persistent systems.
A direct integration of existing technologies of memory encryption with persistent
memory can protect the data, but it eliminates the persistence. Existing CPU extensions
providing memory encryption, such as Intel SGX, AMD SME/SEV, do not expose the
encryption keys to software: a CPU randomly generates these keys after power reset,
and they can be neither read nor uploaded. Therefore, encrypted persistent memory
loses encrypted data in the case of a power failure because the corresponding encryption
key will be regenerated after the power recovery. In other words, encrypted persistent
memory behaves like encrypted volatile memory.
The development of encrypted persistent systems requires both hardware and
software improvements of existing solutions. Similar to ordinary persistent systems,
several models of encrypted persistence could be possible. For example, the
system-wide model of persistence can be used as a basis, and then, parts of the system
should be selectively encrypted, in the same way as AMD SME enables encryption of
memory pages. This approach will require additional support for system software since
it will need to manage ”volatile” memory regions. An alternative to this approach could
be a hardware platform which provides read/write access to encryption keys, and the
corresponding system software which ensures secure access to these keys.
In my future works I want to address these and other architectural challenges of
persistent encrypted systems.
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